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THE EVOLVING LAW OF  
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION IN  
JAPANESE CIVIL PROCEDURE:  
CONTEXT, CULTURE, AND COMMUNITY 
Carl F. Goodman* 
INTRODUCTION 
n 1996, Japan enacted a new Civil Procedure Code as part of its ju-
dicial reform effort (the “1996 Code”).1 It was, to a great extent, a 
rewrite of the old Japanese Civil Procedure Code (the “Old Code”)2 in 
the modern Japanese used by the general public.3 The 1996 Code did, 
however, make several substantial changes. The most significant ad-
dressed procedures dealing with the production of evidence, particularly 
those dealing with document production.4 One new provision expanded 
the scope of documents available for production, but also restricted ex-
pansion so that a document prepared solely for the use of the party in 
possession of the document (a “self-use document”) was excluded from 
production.5 This change represented a compromise between those who 
argued for open production of relevant documents and those who argued 
for retention of the old rule wherein only documents that met three spe-
cific statutory criteria were available for production. It was anticipated 
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 1. MINSOHŌ [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 109 of 1996, translated in 7 EHS 
LAW BULL. SER. no. 2300 (2007) [hereinafter MINSOHŌ]. The 1996 Code was adopted in 
1996 and came into effect in 1998. 
 2. KYŪ-MINSOHŌ [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 29 of 1890, translated in 2 
EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 2300 (2007) [hereinafter KYŪ-MINSOHŌ]. 
 3. See Shozo Ota, Reform of Civil Procedure in Japan, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 561, 563 
(2001) (“The old Code of Civil procedure of 1926 . . . was basically a streamlined version 
of the Code of 1890, which was in turn basically a translation of the German Code of 
Civil Procedure of 1877.”). 
 4. Some of the specific changes included the creation of a new preparation for oral 
argument procedure that permitted parties to engage in private discussions with the court 
before entering the public oral argument phase of the case, MINSOHŌ, arts. 168–74, a new 
inquiry procedure loosely modeled after American interrogatories but without any sanc-
tion or compulsion requiring answers to inquiries, MINSOHŌ, art. 163, and a loosening of 
the procedural requirements that needed to be met as part of a motion to require that a 
party or third person produce documents to be used in litigation. MINSOHŌ, art. 222. 
 5. MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4. 
I 
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that the judicial system would articulate the parameters of this compro-
mise in actual litigations. 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Japan decided Fuji Bank v. Maeda,6 a 
case that broadly interpreted the self-use document exception and se-
verely restricted the right to obtain documents from a recalcitrant party. 
Both lawyers (bengoshi7 as well as foreign lawyers) and judges read Fuji 
Bank as a broad application of the self-use document exception exclud-
ing from production corporate documents prepared by employees for in-
house use and restricted from distribution outside the corporation.8 None-
theless, Japanese bengoshi continued to press lower courts to order the 
production of in-house corporate documents. Over time, these cases 
reached the Supreme Court, which, through a series of decisions inter-
preting the self-use exception, has moderated the reach of Fuji Bank. 
Consequently, although greater production of documents is now possible 
than was originally thought permissible under Fuji Bank, the recent se-
ries of cases has introduced added complexity as to how broadly or nar-
rowly the Court will interpret the self-use document exception to produc-
tion. 
It is the purpose of this Article to update a 2003 study of the 1996 
Code, with special focus on the document production article of the 1996 
Code and the Supreme Court of Japan’s evolving self-use document ju-
                                                                                                             
 6. See Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 MINSHŪ 1787 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1999), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1999.11.12-1999-kyo-No. 
2.html. 
 7. A bengoshi, the rough equivalent of the American lawyer, is licensed to represent 
parties in litigation before all courts in Japan. Bengoshi must belong to a bar association 
and are subject to a special law known as the bengoshi-ho. 
 8. See John O. Haley, Heisei Renewal or Heisei Transformation: Are Legal Reforms 
Really Changing Japan?, 19 J. JAPAN. L. 5, 6 n.6 (2005) [hereinafter Haley, Heisei Re-
newal]. Haley notes: 
The new Code of Civil Procedure . . . is perhaps better described as a revision 
rather than a reform. The new code was designed as a linguistic up-dating of 
the code to make it more accessible to contemporary readers. The new version 
made hardly any substantive changes. Among the few was to be a broadening 
of discovery. However, whatever the intended changes may have been, in light 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in K.K. Fuji Bank v. Maeda . . . denying dis-
covery of a bank memo evaluating a loan application as an “internal” memo 
under [MINSOHŌ] article 220(4)(c), the most significant preexisting limits on 
discovery appear to remain. 
Id. 
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risprudence in the ten years since the 1996 Code was adopted.9 Although 
proceeding cautiously, the Court appears to be relaxing the rules govern-
ing document production to allow parties greater access to documents 
where production will not have a seriously detrimental effect on the op-
erations of the producing entity—while simultaneously creating a doc-
trine that supports Japanese customs and community values. 
This Article contains three parts. Part I provides a background of the 
Japanese civil litigation system so that the cases that address document 
production issues may be placed in a litigation perspective. Part II dis-
cusses the Supreme Court decisions dealing with document production 
under the 1996 Code. Finally, Part III discusses the contextual, cultural, 
and community rationale that underlays and supports the decisions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. A Civil and Common Law Hybrid 
The modern Japanese legal system’s structure resembles that of civil 
law systems.10 Like other civil law systems, its fundamental laws are 
contained in codes. The centerpiece of the Japanese system is the Civil 
Code.11 The basic law of civil procedure is the Civil Procedure Code, 
which was re-written in 1996.12 But Japan’s version of the civil law sys-
tem has always been somewhat different from the classical civil law sys-
tems represented by the Napoleonic Code, where, consistent with the 
equality notion of the Revolution, the law was to be easily understood by 
                                                                                                             
 9. See Carl F. Goodman, Japan’s New Civil Procedure Code: Has it Fostered a Rule 
of Law Dispute Resolution Mechanism?, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 511 (2004) [hereinafter 
Goodman, Japan]. 
 10. For a general discussion of the civil law system, see JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, 
THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (2d ed., Little, Brown and Co. 1977) (1957); ARTHUR TAYLOR 
VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (1977). 
 11. KYU-MINSOHŌ [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 29 of 1890. Although there 
are five basic codes in Japan (Civil Code, Criminal Code, Commercial Code, Code of 
Civil Procedure, and Code of Criminal Procedure), the Constitution is usually referred to 
as part of the compilation of the Six Codes. 
 12. For a discussion of the process and substantive changes made by the 1996 Code, 
see Takeshi Kojima, Symposium Honoring Professor Robert C. Casad: Japanese Civil 
Procedure in Comparative Law Perspective, 46 KAN. L. REV. 687 (1998); Toshiro M. 
Mochizuki, Baby Step or Giant Leap?: Parties’ Expanded Access to Documentary Evi-
dence Under the New Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, 40 HARV. INT’L L. J. 285, 294–
299 (1999); Ota, supra note 3, at 568–70; Yasuhei Taniguchi, The 1996 Code of Civil 
Procedure of Japan—A Procedure for the Coming Century?, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 767 
(1997). 
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all people,13 and the German Civil Code, where the law was considered a 
science.14 Nonetheless, Japan’s civil law system retains the fundamental 
elements of a civil law system (as distinguished from a common law sys-
tem): 
 
(i) Codes are the law, whereas judicial decisions, while 
useful in teaching how judges have interpreted the 
Codes in the past, are not law.15 
 
(ii) Judges are part of a civil service government bu-
reaucracy and their duty is to apply the law as found 
in the Codes, rather than using their authority to 
make their own law. 
 
(iii) Procedure follows the inquest model rather than the 
adversary model of the common law system. As a 
consequence, the judge is in charge of fact-finding 
and is the central figure in all courtroom dramas, 
while the role of the attorney is marginalized.16 In 
Japan, the classical inquest, wherein the judge may 
take evidence ex officio, has been modified to re-
quire that the parties suggest witnesses to be called, 
                                                                                                             
 13. VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 10, at 48–53 (“On July 5, 1790, the Con-
stituent Assembly voted ‘that the civil laws would be reviewed and reformed by the legis-
lators and that there would be made a general code of laws simple, clear and appropriate 
to the constitution.’”) 
 14. See generally Carl Steenstrup, German Reception of Roman Law and Japanese 
Reception of German Law, 1 INT’L J. INTERCULTURAL COMM. STUD. 273, (1991). See also 
VON MEHREN & GORDELY, supra note 10, at 59–68. As a consequence of American influ-
ence after World War II, the current legal system has many common law aspects, render-
ing it in some respects a hybrid system with a decided emphasis on the Civil Law. See 
infra notes 43–44. 
 15. See Kaoru Yunoki, Hanrei Kenkyū No Mokuteki To Hōhō [Objectives and Meth-
ods of Studies of Precedents], 16 HŌ-SHAKAIGAKU KENKYŪ 1, 3–5 (1964), translated in 
THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 150–51 (Hideo Tanaka ed., Univ. of Tokyo Press 1976) 
(“A judgment is after all a solution of a dispute between individuals, which is particular-
istic in nature, and does not establish a general rule which is applicable to all persons. 
This applies also to a judgment of the Supreme Court, even one entered by its grand 
bench.”); Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Com-
parison, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 419, 424, 426 (1967). 
 16. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law 
Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1021 (1998) (“The central task in a civil 
law adjudication is for the judge to identify the legal and factual issues involved and to 
decide them correctly.”). 
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leaving the decision whether to call such witnesses 
to the judge. Moreover, the function of the judge 
encompasses the duty of the State to assure that the 
party in the “right” prevails in litigation.17 
 
(iv) Preclusion rules are an autonomous regime, sepa-
rate from the doctrine of stare decisis. Thus, a 
higher court’s ruling is binding on the lower court 
only in the case in which it is rendered, and is not 
binding on lower courts in other cases.18 
 
(v) Trials are not seen as the end product of a long road 
involving a separate pre-trial discovery procedure. 
Rather, trials are seen as a seamless sequence of 
meetings, evidence gathering, witness testimony 
taking, etc., constituting one “plenary proceeding,” 
at the conclusion of which the judge, having “clari-
fied” the facts and issues, gives her decision.19 
 
(vi) The first-level appeal is seen as a continuation of 
the trial. New evidence and arguments may be pre-
sented if doing so will lead to a correct decision,20 
unlike the appellate review of the trial court record 
in the common law system. Second-level appeal is 
                                                                                                             
 17. Id. (“Under the civil law procedural systems, the judge is responsible for deciding 
a case according to the truth of the matter . . . [and] eliciting relevant evidence.”). 
 18. See MINSOHŌ, arts. 114, 115. Indeed, in cases where the judgment awarded dam-
ages to be paid over time, where there are significantly changed circumstances, it is pos-
sible to initiate a new suit to lower or increase the amount awarded to take account of the 
changed circumstances. See MINSOHŌ, art. 117. 
 19. The Japanese trial or “plenary hearing” is broken into parts—a preliminary oral 
argument stage, which is like a traditional trial, and a second stage, where witness testi-
mony and documents are presented. See MINSOHŌ, arts. 148, 164–67. Both the prelimi-
nary oral argument and the oral argument stages are part of the continuous, plenary hear-
ing. The 1996 Code introduced another procedure, the preparation for oral argument, 
which is less formal and is also less open to public view. This stage is designed to move 
cases more quickly and to encourage early settlements. See Ota, supra note 3, at 568–70. 
For a general discussion of Japanese procedure, see CARL F. GOODMAN, JUSTICE AND 
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN (2004) [hereinafter GOODMAN, JUSTICE]. 
 20. See Akira Mikazuki, Saibansho Seido [Judicial System], 5 NIHONKOKU KEMPŌ 
TAIKEI 73 (J. Tanaka ed., 1962), translated in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 
15, at 444, 465–68. For a chart showing the percentage of cases where the first level ap-
peal court received new evidence in the form of witness testimony on appeal, see 
GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 436. 
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seen as a review of the case to correct errors made 
by the lower court, unlike the role of American 
highest courts, which resolve splits among courts 
within their jurisdiction to ensure uniformity.21 
 
Nonetheless, the Japanese system has retained elements that in one 
way or another mirror notions of common law or customary law sys-
tems.22 For example, while the Commercial Code trumps the Civil Code 
when it comes to commercial matters, issues not resolved by the Com-
mercial Code are determined by commercial custom.23 Only in the ab-
sence of such custom does the Civil Code come into play.24 Thus, the 
provisions of the Civil Code that determine whether a written document 
is required for a contract (generally it is not, as there is no general statute 
against frauds in the civil law system) are not applied when the commer-
cial custom in the industry favors written contracts.25 In addition, media-
tion, conciliation, and negotiation are the preferred means of dispute 
resolution, rather than the invocation of the state’s coercive power 
through the organized judiciary.26 The assistance of the judiciary may, 
                                                                                                             
 21. Compare BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF 
APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 11 (2d ed. 1909) (describing the court’s function as 
“not of declaring justice between man and man, but of settling the law.”), with Masako 
Kamiya, Narrowing the Avenues to Japan’s Supreme Court: The Policy Implications of 
Japan’s Code of Civil Procedure Reforms, 4 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 53, 64 (2002) (noting 
that the American system of limited review may not lead to a “just” result). 
 22. See THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 15, at 59 (“Custom is to regulate a 
transaction if it is found that the parties either explicitly or impliedly acted upon it, so 
long as such custom is not repugnant to public policy. . . . If the custom in question is so 
well established that the people concerned regard it as ipso facto binding upon them, it is 
called customary law (kanshū hō) and is applied without the necessity of an allegation by 
either party.”). 
 23. See SHŌHŌ [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, art. 1, translated in EHS 
LAW BULL. SER. no. 2200 (2001). 
 24. See id.  
 25. CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 360–
61 (2003) [hereinafter, GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW ]. Goodman explains: 
Thus, while in the case of a soy-bean contract a writing may not be required 
because the custom in the industry is to do things orally, a contract will be re-
quired in certain real estate transactions, not because the Code says a contract is 
required but because it is the customary thing to do. 
Id. 
 26. For a discussion of the role of conciliation, see DAN FENNO HENDERSON, 
CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW: TOKUGAWA AND MODERN, 2 vols. (1965). See also 
Masayuki Yoshida, Discussion Paper, The Reluctant Japanese Litigant: A “New”  
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however, be invoked to facilitate the process of conciliation and settle-
ment.27 And, finally, consistent with Emperor Meiji’s Charter Oath,28 
which called for a break with the evils of the past and for determinations 
based on the just laws of nature, Japanese judges are not immune from 
the temptation to create legal rules based on reason rather than the letter 
of the law.29 
B. History 
The Japanese version of the civil law system was adopted in the late 
nineteenth century as a step towards modernization of the legal system. 
Although the ruling class did not believe that the codes borrowed from 
France and Germany represented either pre-existing Japanese customary 
rules or legal ideals, they recognized that they must convince the West-
ern imperialist powers that Japan’s legal system was civilized.30 
                                                                                                             
Assessment, ELEC. J. CONTEMP. JUST. STUD. 5 (2003), available at http://www.japanese 
studies.org.uk/discussionpapers/Yoshida.html (“In Japan there appears to be a preference 
for mediation and conciliation. This is in sharp contrast to how similar disputes might be 
settled in the United States and elsewhere in the Western world, where some forms of 
legal proceedings would constitute an initial position.”); Alan Macfarlane, Law and Cus-
tom in Japan: Some Comparative Reflections, 10(3) CONTINUITY & CHANGE 369 (1995), 
available at http://alanmacfarlane.com/TEXTS/law&custom.pdf (“[I]n 1987 ‘roughly one 
third of all civil lawsuits in the first instance (district court) are concluded as default 
judgments or withdrawal of complaints[,] . . . another third are contested judgments; . . . 
the remain[der] are in-court compromises.’ There are various theories . . . to account for 
this preference for conciliation.”). 
 27. See MINJI CHŌTEIHŌ [Law for Conciliation of Civil Affairs], Law No. 222 of 
1950, translated in 2 EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 2360 (1999). See also Kota Fukui, Justice 
System Reform in Japan: The Connection Between Conflict Management and Realization 
of General Rules of Law, 51 OSAKA U. L. REV. 55, 55 n.3, 66–67, 74 (2004); GOODMAN, 
JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 398–406; Shunko Muto, Concerning Trial Leadership in Liti-
gation: Focusing on the Judge’s Inquiry and Compromise, 12 LAW IN JAPAN 23 (1979); 
Tetsuya Obuchi, The Role of the Court in the Process of Informal Dispute Resolution in 
Japan: Traditional and Modern Aspects, With Special Emphasis on In-Court Compro-
mise, 20 LAW IN JAPAN 74, 75 (1987); Chin Kim & Craig M. Lawson, The Law of the 
Subtle Mind: The Traditional Japanese Conception of Law, 28 INT’L & COMP. L. 
QUARTERLY 491, 507–08 (1979) (“Conciliation procedures, however, are not exclusively 
extra-judicial, but are now also an important part of the enacted procedural law.”). 
 28. For a translation of the Charter Oath of Five Articles (1868), see W.W. MCLAREN, 
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS VOL. 1 8 n.1 (Univ. Publications of America, reprint 
ed., 1979). 
 29. See YOSHIYUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 222–24 (Anthony H. 
Angelo trans. & ed., 1976) (1966). 
 30. The adoption of the Civil Law system was a part of Japan’s modernization during 
the Meiji era and was an essential step in the renegotiation of the unequal treaties under 
which Japan had lost a great deal of her sovereignty to the Western powers. See Harald 
Hohmann, Modern Japanese Law: Legal History and the Concept of Law: Public Law 
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The first step to modernization was quite natural—a look to the Chi-
nese legal system that had been the font of Japanese law beginning in the 
seventh century.31 However, it was quickly realized that borrowing Chi-
nese legal rules would not achieve the objective sought by the ruling 
class: to regain Japanese sovereignty that had been wrested away by the 
imperialist Western powers through treaties that stripped Japan of vari-
ous sovereign powers.32 The Westerners, who applied extraterritoriality 
and Consular Courts to China, would not undo these institutions in Japan 
if Chinese law was adopted as Japanese law. Thus, the natural second 
step was to find and adopt a Western legal system that would convince 
the Western imperialist powers that Japan had a modern, civilized legal 
system.33 
As an initial matter, Japan’s leaders were split between the civil law 
system of France and the common law system of England. French law 
was being taught at the law school created at the Ministry of Justice, giv-
ing members of the French School a decided advantage in its influence 
on Japanese legal thinking.34 Common law, on the other hand, resembled 
Tokugawa principles in some respects, as the Tokugawa Magistrates had, 
at least in the later days of the Shogunate, been attempting to create some 
                                                                                                             
and Economic Law of Japan, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 151, 155 (1996) (in discussing Wilhelm 
Rohl’s explanation of the Westernization process of Japanese law: “Since these ‘unequal 
treaties’ were criticized as threats to Japan’s full sovereignty by many Japanese, the Em-
peror saw only one chance to modify them; by establishing an European legal order in 
Japan—this was often regarded as a prerequisite for a modification of these treaties by 
those foreigners . . . .”). 
 31. See generally PAUL HENG-CHAO CH’EN, THE FORMATION OF THE EARLY MEIJI 
LEGAL ORDER: THE JAPANESE CODE OF 1871 AND ITS CHINESE FOUNDATION (1981). See 
also Hohmann, supra note 30, at 155. 
 32. For example, such treaties had the effect of nullifying Japanese ability to raise the 
unreasonably low tariffs on imported products that had destroyed the Japanese monetary 
system. They also placed Westerners in charge of legal matters involving their own citi-
zens through extraterritoriality provisions and the creation of “Consular Courts.” See 
Hohmann, supra note 30, at 155. 
 33. See DANIEL V. BOTSMAN, PUNISHMENT AND POWER IN THE MAKING OF MODERN 
JAPAN 144–45 (Princeton Univ. Press 2005) (“The new Chinese-style penal code cer-
tainly did nothing to help the Japanese leader’s cause. . . . [I]t was precisely in order to 
protect British subjects from Chinese laws that the institution of extraterritoriality had 
been introduced to East Asia in the first place.”). 
 34. A French school of law was established in the Ministry of Justice in 1873 and an 
Academy of French Law was established in 1876. See HENG-CHAO CH’EN, supra note 31, 
at 72–73; HIDEO TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 201–03 (1976); Kenzo Takaya-
nagi, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law, 1868-1961, in LAW IN 
JAPAN, THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 5, 27 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed., 
1963). 
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systematic rules based on the decisions reached by the Magistrates.35 A 
vibrant English School objected to the French-inspired Civil Code, and 
was supported by nationalists who, for entirely different reasons, op-
posed the new Civil Code.36 A Francophile Civil Code was written (with 
the assistance of French legal scholars) but the English School was suc-
cessful in postponing its final adoption. 
With the adoption of a Germanized Constitution and the ascendance of 
German legal thinking in Japan,37 the Civil Code was rewritten to adopt 
the German style, while retaining some French elements.38 The family 
law and inheritance provisions, which applied to all Japanese society, 
were written to embody the family law system of the Samurai class (the 
ie).39 While the Criminal Procedure Code retained a French orientation, 
the Code of Civil Procedure was based on the German Civil Procedure 
Code.40 
Yet before the adoption of Western codes, an indigenous judicial sys-
tem was required to deal with cases that were not within the jurisdiction 
of the Consular Courts. Judges needed guidance as to how to approach 
cases until written laws governing the entire array of anticipated prob-
lems could be adopted. The ruling oligarchs found the answer to this di-
lemma in the use of custom and reason as a foundational principle for 
                                                                                                             
 35. See Steenstrup, supra note 14, at 282. 
 36. See Shinichiro Michida assisted by Robert Braucher, The Legal Structure for 
Economic Enterprise: Some Aspects of Japanese Commercial Law, in LAW IN JAPAN, 
THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 507, 512 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed., 
1963); Steenstrup, supra note 14, at 284. Professor Noda notes that in the early stage of 
westernization, Japan looked to French law; this was ultimately superseded by German 
influences. See NODA, supra note 29, at 194–208. 
 37. The German legal thinking was perhaps influenced in part by the Prussian victory 
in the Franco-Prussian War, but certainly influenced by Ito Hirabuni’s preference for a 
German—as opposed to either a French or English—constitutional regime. Ito Hirabuni 
was the head of the Japanese Constitution writing committee and a prominent figure in 
the government during the Meiji era. 
 38. See Wilhelm Röhl, Generalities, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868 1–28 
(Wilhelm Röhl ed., 2005). For a discussion of the Code debate and history, see Ronald 
Frank, Civil Code, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 1868 172–88 (Wilhelm Röhl ed., 
2005). 
 39. See V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE 28 (1992) (“Ja-
pan’s historical form of family organization is called ie. . . . In Japanese family life ie 
refers to the descent group to which an individual belongs. The ie continues backward 
and forward in time, and the living family members are but a representative of the under-
lying lineal genealogy.”)  
 40. For a discussion of the adoption of the Western codes in the context of the rene-
gotiation of the “unequal treaties,” see Frank, supra note 38, at 169 and GOODMAN, 
JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 49–71. 
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judicial decisions.41 Naturally, reason required the judge to find what was 
considered a fair, reasonable, and appropriate determination—much as 
the Tokugawa Magistrate had done. When the Western codes were 
adopted as Japanese law, pre-war judges continued to utilize custom and 
reason in their decision-making.42 
The defeat of Japan and the subsequent Occupation,43 headed by 
Americans with a decided preference for the common law, as well as the 
adoption of a constitution infused with common law thinking, brought 
about corresponding changes in the Civil Procedure Code and the judi-
cial system. Echoing the U.S. Constitution, Japan established a single 
                                                                                                             
 41. See Wilhelm Röhl, Law of Civil Procedure, in HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN SINCE 
1868 665 (Wilhelm Röhl ed., 2005) (According to general principles of adjudication, as 
set forth by decree of the dajōkan in 1875, “[j]udgment of civil cases shall be rendered 
according to custom in the absence of law; and in the absence of custom they shall be 
decided according to reason.”). 
 42. The Western Codes were adopted over a period of years after the Meiji Restora-
tion. The process was complete before World War I and the judges before, and even after, 
World War II continued to use custom and reason in their decisions. See NODA, supra 
note 29, at 223–24. Tom Ginsberg comments: 
Particularly whenever a clear answer was not to be found, the judges would 
utilize the (pre-Meiji) notion of ‘judicial reason’ to find that particular Western 
norms ought to be adopted as logical rules. This adaptation played an important 
role in transforming the normative basis of Japanese law. 
Tom Ginsberg, Japanese Legal Reform in Historical Perspective 23 (October 8,  
2002) (unpublished article), www.law.uiuc.edu/academics/asianlaw/pdfs/JapaneseLegal 
ReforminHistoricalPerspective-revised.pdf. In a similar vein, Seigo Hirowatari observes:  
By this I mean a phenomenon wherein social relations are not established in 
terms of rights and duties, but by traditional, social norms: norms dictated by 
moral and social obligation (giri) and personal emotion (ninjo), which are in-
definite and based primarily upon the customary practices of communities. The 
result is that social conflicts are mostly solved without resort to the courts. This 
phenomenon was explicitly identified as a ‘problem to be overcome’ in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II . . . . 
Seigo Hirowatari, Post-War Japan and the Law: Mapping Discourses of Legalization and 
Modernization, 3 SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 155, 156 (2000). 
 43. Following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan accepted the 
Potsdam Declaration and unconditionally surrendered to the Allies. American military 
forces under General MacArthur occupied the main islands of Japan. Although nominally 
an “Allied Occupation,” the reality was that the American forces were in control of the 
Occupation, while Japan retained a form of government with a Cabinet and a Diet that 
could pass laws. Legislation was subject to Occupation approval and the government 
adopted many laws in compliance with Occupation goals. Included among the laws pro-
posed by the American Occupation was the current Japanese Constitution. See 
GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 75–160. 
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judicial system headed by a Supreme Court with authority to handle all 
cases of both public and private law. Although the constitution prohibits 
the creation of specialized public law courts, such as an administrative 
court or a constitutional court that are a mainstay of most civil law sys-
tems,44 the Japanese judicial system created panels at the trial court level 
(district courts) to ensure that specialist judges with knowledge of the 
administrative climate and administrative law hear administrative law 
cases. 
C. The Function of Japanese Judges and Attorneys 
The quintessential American common law idea of judicial review en-
shrined in Marshall’s decision in Marbury v. Madison is granted to the 
Japanese court system by the Japanese Constitution.45 But in a system 
rooted in a narrow doctrine of preclusion that forswears stare decisis, the 
question of what exactly a finding of unconstitutionality in one case 
means for future cases is unclear.46 Moreover, a court system that lacks 
the power of contempt or any substitute to enforce its orders without as-
sistance from the public prosecutor is unlikely to aggressively pursue its 
judicial review power—as is the case with the Japanese Supreme Court. 
In over fifty years, it has held laws unconstitutional in only seven cases.47 
                                                                                                             
 44. See KENPŌ, art. 76, para. 2. 
 45. KENPŌ, art. 81 (“The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to de-
termine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.”). 
 46. See HIROSHI ITOH, THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES 
108–110 (1989); Ichiro Kitamura, The Judiciary in Contemporary Society: Japan, 25 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 263, 277 (1993). 
 47. See, e.g. Aizawa v. Japan, 27 KEISHŪ 265, (Sup. Ct., Apr. 4, 1973) translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1973.04.04-1970-A-No.1310 
.html (holding unconstitutional Japan’s Patricide Law, which was enacted as part of the 
support system for the old feudal family law system that venerated ancestors); Sumiyoshi 
v. Governor of Hiroshima, 29 MINSHŪ 572 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 30, 1975) translation available 
at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1975.04.30-1968-Gyo-Tsu-No.120. 
html (holding unconstitutional a law that prohibited locating pharmacies near each other 
violated the right to choose an occupation when the law had no basis other than to stifle 
competition); Hiraguchi v. Hiraguchi, 41 MINSHŪ 408 (Sup. Ct., Apr 22, 1987) translated 
in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIRSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 
THROUGH 1990 327, 329 (1996) (holding unconstitutional as a violation of property rights 
the pre-war law that permitted division of a forest by a greater-than-fifty-percent owner 
but not by a less-than-fifty-percent owner); Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election 
Comm’n, 30 MINSHŪ 223 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 4, 1976) translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & 
HIRSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 355, 363 
(1996) (holding unconstitutional certain voter disparities that denied equality to those 
who lived in populous districts where their votes counted for less than those living in 
sparsely populated districts); Kanao v. Hiroshima Prefecture Election Comm’n, 39 
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During the Occupation, the Old Code was amended to provide a 
greater role for attorneys. The Occupation objected to the dominant pa-
ternalistic Japanese judge; thus, the role of the judge was subordinated to 
attorneys’ examination and cross-examination.48 Although the Old Code 
was amended during the American Occupation to include cross-
examination provisions and appeared to place lawyers at the front of the 
litigation process,49 the reality was that post-war Japanese lawyers were 
untrained in adversary trial methods, which conflicted with the norms of 
harmony and avoidance of conflict in Japanese society. Moreover, Japa-
nese judges did not change their ways simply because the Code placed 
                                                                                                             
MINSHŪ 1100 (Sup. Ct., July 17, 1985) translation available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1985.07.17-1984-Gyo-Tsu-No.339.html 
(holding unconstitutional certain voter disparities that denied equality to those who lived 
in populous districts where their votes counted for less than those living in sparsely popu-
lated districts); Case No. 1767 of 1999, 56 MINSHŪ 1439 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 11, 2002) trans-
lation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2002.09.11-1999.-O-
.No.1767.html (holding the Post Office Law’s limits on liability and damages to be un-
constitutional limits on the right to sue the state); Case Nos. 82 and 83 of 2001, 59 
MINSHŪ NO. 7 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 14, 2005) translation available at http://www.courts. 
go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.09.14-2001.-Gyo-Tsu-.No..82%2C.2001.-Gyo-Hi.No.. 
76%2C.2001.-Gyo-Tsu-.No..83%2C.2001.-Gyo-Hi-.No..77.html (holding that it was 
unconstitutional to prohibit voting by Japanese citizens assigned to work abroad in single 
district election districts). 
 48. See ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN 131–32 (1976). Writ-
ing about the Japanese criminal law system, Professor Daniel Foote notes:  
[U]nder the influence of the Occupation following World War II, Japan 
adopted an adversary system that, in structure, is very similar to that of the 
United States. In practice, however, the adversary system operates in a much 
less adversarial fashion in Japan than in the United States.  
Daniel H. Foote, Reflections on Japan’s Cooperative Adversary Process, in THE 
JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT 29 (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa 
eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2002). 
 49. See MINSOHŌ, art. 202, para. 1 (providing that the party offering the witness di-
rectly examines the witnesses first, followed by examination by the opposition party, and 
finally examination by the court); MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU, art. 114 (using the phrase 
“cross-examination” and limiting cross-examination to credibility and matters brought 
out in direct examination). But see MINSOHŌ, art. 205 (expressing a preference and ac-
cepting written witness statements in lieu of oral testimony); MINSOHŌ, art. 202, para. 2 
(permitting the judge to modify the order of examination so that the court may question 
the witness first). These provisions diminish the role of cross-examination. Indeed, there 
are few, if any, oral witnesses in the typical Japanese civil case. In 2001, 85.5% of cases 
had no witnesses testify, and in 2002, that percentage increased to 86.4%. See GOODMAN, 
JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 354. 
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them in a different light.50 In addition, unlike in the United States where 
it is common for lawyers to represent parties, parties in Japan at the first-
level trial frequently appear pro se,51 inspiring judges to rise to their de-
fense when the occasion demanded. As a consequence, the trial process 
atrophied into a procedure that minimized lawyer participation and 
maximized the role of the judge. Judges with a paternalistic attitude to-
wards the parties and attorneys before them once again predominated 
despite the Occupation era reform of the Old Code.52 
The Occupation’s view of judicial reform resulted in the abolishment 
of Japan’s Administrative Court in favor of a single judiciary without 
special courts,53 the adoption of judicial review, and the grant of inde-
pendence from the Ministry of Justice to the judiciary.54 As a conse-
quence, the immediate post-war judicial system was composed mostly of 
judges who had served pre-war. As the system was bureaucratic in nature 
(the Occupation had taken the judicial bureaucracy out of the hands of 
the Ministry of Justice and placed it in the hands of the Supreme Court), 
the more senior judges in the system were those who had served the 
longest pre-war and the judges appointed post-war tended to be junior to 
those who had served in the pre-war period. On bench, these judges quite 
naturally applied the legal thinking that had guided them through the 
Hogakubu law faculties they had attended and the reasoning they applied 
to cases before the war.55 That thinking was strongly influenced by cus-
tom, reason, and the notion of Japanese norms of behavior. Pre-war 
judges tended to decide cases according to what was viewed as right or 
                                                                                                             
 50. See Kohji Tanabe assisted by John B. Hurlbut, The Process of Litigation: An Ex-
periment With the Adversary System, in LAW IN JAPAN 73, 74 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren 
ed., 1963); GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 184. 
 51. See Goodman, Japan, supra note 9, at 567. 
 52. This is especially true in a system like Japan’s, where the judge is not an impartial 
referee, but rather is a representative of the state charged with ensuring that the correct 
party wins. See Tanabe, supra note 50, at 87; Makoto Itoh, The Reception in Japan of the 
American Law and its Transformation in the Fifty Years since the End of World War II: 
Civil Procedure Law, 26 LAW IN JAPAN 66, 68–69 (2000). 
 53. Before World War II, Japan’s Administrative Court operated as a tribunal inde-
pendent from the primary judiciary, as is common in civil law systems. However, 
changes to the Japanese Constitution in 1946 provided that “no extraordinary tribunal 
shall be established, nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive be given final judicial 
power.” KENPŌ, art. 76, para. 2. 
 54. See OPPLER, supra note 48, at 85–91; Takaaki Hattori assisted by Richard W. 
Rabinowitz, The Legal Profession in Japan: Its Historical Development and Present 
State, in LAW IN JAPAN 111, 121–24, 130 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed., 1963). 
 55. See Tanabe, supra note 50, at 90–94. For a discussion of the development of the 
Japanese “legal mind” and the influence of senior judges on more junior judges, see JOHN 
OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 121–22 (1998) [hereinafter HALEY, SPIRIT]. 
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appropriate in the circumstances, rather than based on the science of the 
Code or other statutory principle.56 
The ability of Japanese judges to create a body of judge-made law, 
much as American judges can, is highlighted by lines of decisions like 
those that establish the legal foundation for the lifetime employment sys-
tem,57 the rights of tenants to remain in possession of leased property 
even though the term of the lease has expired,58 and the rights of distribu-
tors not to be terminated unless procedures deemed fair under the cir-
cumstances are followed.59 And, like common law courts, Japanese 
                                                                                                             
 56. See Takayanagi, supra note 34, at 25–27. See also HALEY, SPIRIT, supra note 55, 
at 205 (“In case after case throughout the century, Japanese judges have denied ‘rights’ in 
order to ameliorate what they have perceived to be the injustice of property and contract 
enabling those with greater economic or social leverage to enlist the aid of the state 
against those with whom they dealt.”). Prewar judges also applied the Japanese concept 
of jori (also written as dori). This application was based, at least in part, on Decree No. 
103 of 1875, which provided that when no written law or custom applied to a case, the 
judge should apply reason. See Takayanagi, supra note 34, at 25–26. 
 57. See Daniel Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism 
in the Service of—Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635 (1996); Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Rela-
tional Theory of Japanese Corporate Governance: Contract, Culture, and the Rule of 
Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L. J. 3, 44 (1996) (“Judge-made law supports the lifetime employ-
ment system by supplying bargaining endowments to both employers and employees, 
enabling malleable, long-term employment patterns.”). For a critique of Foote’s explana-
tion that the rule arose as a consequence of the judiciary’s action to protect a weaker 
party (the employees) from the unilateral action of a stronger party (the employer) while 
maintaining stability, see David Kettler & Charles T. Tackney, Light from a Dead Sun: 
The Japanese Lifetime Employment System and Weimar Labor Law, 19 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 1 (1997). Kettler and Tackney, while agreeing with Foote’s basic theory that 
lifetime employment is a product of judge-made law, believe that “[n]ot judicial tradi-
tionalism but a novel combination of labor activism and imported legal approaches led 
Japanese courts to assimilate the employment relationship Foote emphasizes.” Id. at 4. 
 58. See Yukio Noguchi, Land Problems and Policies in Japan; Structural Aspects, in 
LAND ISSUES IN JAPAN: A POLICY FAILURE? 26 (John O. Haley & Kozo Yamamura eds., 
Society for Japanese Studies 1992). See also Fukui, supra note 27, at 69 n.37 (“In the 
realm of lease law in Japan, . . . the theory of trust relations has developed.”). 
 59. See WILLEM M. VISSER ‘T HOOFT, JAPANESE CONTRACT AND ANTI-TRUST LAW: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY 46–47 (2002) (“Since no specific legal rules 
govern the termination disputes between manufacturers and distributors, court decisions 
have constituted the main source of law . . . . [I]n cases of termination, Japanese Courts 
do sometimes not distinguish the differences between distribution agreements and other 
continuing commercial contracts . . . .”). For a discussion of judicial law-making in the 
area of landlord-tenant relations, see HALEY, SPIRIT, supra note 55, at 140–47. For a dis-
cussion of judicial law-making in the areas of labor and employment law, see TAKASHI 
ARAKI, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN JAPAN 23 (Japan Institute of Labor 2002) (“The 
most important characteristic of legal protection for employment security, restraint on 
dismissals, is not imposed by legislation (statutes) but by case law or judicial precedent  
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judges may modify court-established rules to meet new circumstances.60 
In applying both the good faith and morals as well as the abuse of rights 
provisions of the Civil Code,61 Japanese judges are not averse to the ap-
plication of Japanese norms, even when a statute or the constitution itself 
may point in a different direction. This kind of common law approach is 
not a reflection of the influence of American legal thinking, but rather 
reflects indigenous Japanese thinking on the proper role of the judiciary 
in society. It reflects a subtle blend of civil law, common law, and cus-
tomary law. 
The function of the judge in rendering a “right” decision, meaning a 
decision in which the party who should win does win, is based on Ger-
man legal thinking. Although modern cases eschew such a hard and fast 
rule, the reality is that the Japanese judge sees it as her function to make 
the correct decision. What is correct depends very much on the circum-
stances at the time of decision as well as at the time of the act, social 
norms, and the facts of the case.62 
D. Post-War Movement to Broader Production Practice 
The post-war circumstance of Japan was dire indeed. The war left a 
ravaged country with little or no economic structure. To most, the first 
order of the day was to rebuild the economy and, as a consequence, 
many other values took second place to the creation of the economic 
miracle.63 Courts were not immune to this need. It was not until the Mi-
                                                                                                             
. . . . [E]mployers’ freedom to dismiss is significantly curtailed by the established case 
law requiring just cause.”) and Foote, supra note 57. 
 60. See VISSER ‘T HOOFT, supra note 59, at 187. Visser ‘T Hooft remarks:  
[R]ecently in relation to termination disputes the Japanese courts have tended 
to place more emphasis on the principles of classical contract law, such as the 
freedom of contract. . . . Many factors such as the current poor economic cli-
mate and internationalisation may have reduced the reliance upon unwritten so-
cial codes and mutual trust. 
Id. 
 61. See MINPŌ [Civil Code], Law No. 89 of 1896, arts. 1, 90, translated in EHS LAW 
BULL. SER. no. 2100–2101 (2007). 
 62. See Fukui, supra note 27, at 70–75; Tanabe, supra note 50, at 87, 92–94. See also 
HALEY, SPIRIT, supra note 55, at 156–76. 
 63. See Julian Gresser, Koichiro Fujikura, & Akio Morishima, The Crucible of Value 
Transformation—Excerpts from Environmental Law in Japan, 7 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VAL-
UES 61, 61 (1982) (“World War II left Japan economically, socially, and politically desti-
tute. The transcendent concern of the Japanese in the early postwar period was economic 
recovery . . . . It was assumed that industrial growth was an immutable ‘good’ to which 
all else might be subordinated.”). 
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namata disease and other major pollution cases,64 which marked a change 
in Japan’s attitude toward environmental matters, that values other than 
purely economic values were embraced. As a consequence, the power of 
major corporations to affect the Civil Procedure Code and civil proce-
dure in general diminished, enabling others to press for changes that 
might help plaintiffs in litigation against corporations. Moreover, many 
bengoshi, freed from the supervision of the Ministry of Justice, saw it as 
their role to strenuously represent the interests of their clients and to per-
form a societal service by representing the weak against the strong.65 
Many of these lawyers looked to the United States where the discovery 
rules were perceived to favor individual plaintiffs in disputes with corpo-
rations by placing corporate documents and other information in the 
hands of plaintiffs’ lawyers. Many Japanese judges also desired access to 
some internal corporate documents so that a correct decision could be 
rendered in the case.66 
While the civil law system generally does not have a vibrant discovery 
process, the system in Japan does recognize a need for parties to produce 
evidence relevant to a case.67 As the judge (as inquisitor) is the player 
who elicits the facts, the classic civil law system sees it as an abuse of the 
system for parties or their representatives to discuss the case with poten-
                                                                                                             
 64. For a discussion of the Big Four pollution cases, see FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND 
SOCIAL POLICY IN POST WAR JAPAN (Harvard Univ. Press 1987); Frank K. Upham, Liti-
gation and Moral Consciousness in Japan: An Interpretive Analysis of Four Japanese 
Pollution Suits, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579 (1976). 
 65. See Case No. 2126 of 2005, 61 MINSHŪ NO. 3 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 24, 2007) (Mutsuo 
Tahara, J., concurring) translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/ 
judgments/text/2007.04.24-2005.-Ju-.No..2126.html; Toshiro Nishimura, Partner, Nishi-
mura & Partners, Speech at the Temple University in Japan “Professional Ethics in Inter-
national Business” Seminar: The Code of Ethics Applicable to Bengoshi (Dec. 1, 1998), 
www.tuj.ac.jp/newsite/main/law/benethics.html. Similarly, as lawyers are seen as repre-
senting the public interest, including the interest to assure that the government does not 
abuse rights, bengoshi are prohibited (with limited exceptions) from being employed full 
time by government agencies. See Bengoshi hō [Lawyers Law of Japan], Law No. 205 of 
1949, art. 30, translated in EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 2040 (2001) (“A lawyer shall not 
concurrently assume any public post for which compensation is made.”). 
 66. In Japan, the judge determines what evidence is relevant and probative, while also 
serving as the decision maker. The judge’s function is to see that the party who should 
win does in fact win. See supra note 62 and citations therein. Prior to the enactment of 
the New Code, many Japanese judges loosely interpreted the Old Code’s document pro-
duction article to permit greater production so that parties could properly form either their 
claim or defense. See Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 290. 
 67. For a discussion of some mechanisms to obtain information in Japan, see Koji 
Harada, Discovery Under Japanese Law, 16 LAW IN JAPAN 21 (1983) and Craig P. Wag-
nild, Civil Law Discovery in Japan: A Comparison of Japanese and U.S. Methods of 
Evidence Collection in Litigation, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2002). 
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tial witnesses.68 Witnesses are to be examined by the judge without ad-
vance preparation by the lawyer or party.69 The pre-war Japanese system 
(and this remains true in the post-war period as well) allowed lawyers to 
send questions to prospective witnesses through the lawyer’s Bar Asso-
ciation, thus avoiding the charge that the lawyer was influencing the tes-
timony.70 But there was, and still is, no mechanism requiring the Bar As-
sociation to forward the questions or compelling the witness to answer 
them. The Americanization of Japan’s civil procedure system, which 
elevated the questioning of witnesses by the lawyers to a central feature, 
anticipated that, as in America, the lawyer in a case would interview wit-
nesses before their testimony was given.71 Nonetheless, the Code of Civil 
Procedure retains the pre-war procedure and many Japanese lawyers still 
utilize the old system of forwarding questions through the Bar Associa-
tions rather than risk the appearance of influencing the witnesses’ re-
sponses.72 This approach, in turn, leads to ineffective direct examination 
and leaves lawyers to rely on the court’s questioning of witnesses,73 even 
if the Code places that responsibility on counsel.74 
The civil law system in Japan has produced long, drawn-out, and con-
tested cases, some of which last for many years before a judge is pre-
                                                                                                             
 68. For the lawyer to interview a witness before the judge has examined the witness 
would be considered an ethics breach, as the lawyer does not play a role in gathering 
evidence in the civil law system—this is a judicial function. See Tanabe, supra note 50, at 
75. The gathering of evidence is a “sovereign” function performed by the state’s repre-
sentative, the judge. See Hazard, supra note 16, at 1019–20. 
 69. See Tanabe, supra note 50, at 96 (“Under the prewar Japanese system . . . pretrial 
interview of witnesses was forbidden . . . .”). 
 70. See Bengoshi hō [Lawyers Law of Japan], Law No. 205 of 1949, art. 23, para. 3, 
translated in EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 2040 (2001). Questions sent through the Bar As-
sociation may be sent prior to the filing of the Complaint. There is no requirement to 
reply to questions sent through the Bar Association. 
 71. See Tanabe, supra note 50, at 81–83. 
 72. For a discussion of the Bar Association question process, see Craig P. Wignild, 
Civil Law Discovery in Japan: A Comparison of Japanese and U.S. Methods of Evidence 
Collection in Civil Litigation, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y JOURNAL 1, 10 (2002) and Ha-
rada, supra note 67, at 25–26. 
 73. See Itoh, supra note 52, at 68. See generally Tanabe, supra note 50. 
 74. See MINSOHŌ, art. 202; MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU [Japanese Rules of Civil Proce-
dure], art. 113, para. 1–2, art. 114, translated in TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO 
HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN (Taniguchi-Reich-Miyake ed., Juris Publishing 
2007) (1983) [hereinafter MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU]. Some critique the American approach 
of placing responsibility for questioning in the hands of the lawyers, and argue that the 
process was bound to fail because of the lack of discovery in Japan. See, e.g., Kojima, 
supra note 12, at 706–07 (“Witnesses are to be examined reciprocally, that is by both 
parties. . . . Partly because there was no discovery, reciprocal examination did not work 
effectively.”). 
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pared to render a decision. Of course, such long procedures make litiga-
tion an ineffective method of resolving disputes, yielding the varied con-
ciliation and mediation methods of dispute resolution that are ubiquitous 
in Japan.75 But a technologically industrialized Japan is bound to have 
some litigation, and political pressures to conclude cases more quickly 
have emerged. Responding to that pressure, the 1996 Code provided a 
statutory base for a new “Preparation for Oral Argument” phase of a 
case, wherein the formalities of a public trial could be avoided, enabling 
a relatively quick settlement.76 
The 1996 Code also looked to the American discovery model for tools 
to accelerate the plenary proceeding phase of a litigated case. The 
American interrogatory was seen as a vehicle to accomplish this goal 
while also aiding both the court and the parties. As a consequence, a pre-
filing inquiry was adopted, under which a potential plaintiff could send 
questions to his target defendant in an effort to cabin the issues for the 
potential litigation.77 Once litigation was initiated, the same process 
could be used post-filing to gather evidence.78 However, unlike Ameri-
can interrogatories, there is no compulsion on the part of the receiving 
party to respond to inquiries, whether pre- or post-filing.79 Because the 
process can be elected post-filing, most Japanese parties find it more 
convenient and consistent with past practices to utilize the inquiry proc-
ess, if at all, after the case has been filed.80 Then, if a party refuses to re-
spond, the judge, who has power to compel a party to be forthcoming, 
may be prevailed upon to request the same information.81 The result has 
been that pre-filing inquiry is of virtually no use and post-filing inquiry 
                                                                                                             
 75. See supra note 26. See also GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 25, at 259–
63. For a discussion of various alternative dispute resolution mechanisms available in 
Japan, see GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 199–204. 
 76. See MINSOHŌ, art. 168–74. 
 77. See MINSOHŌ, art. 132-2–132-8. See also Koichi Miki, Roles of Judges and Attor-
neys Under the Non-Sanction Scheme in Japanese Civil Procedure, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 31, 37 (2003). 
 78. See MINSOHŌ, art. 163. For a discussion of the inquiry process both pre-filing and 
post-filing, see GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 19. 
 79. See MINSOHŌ, art. 163. See also Miki, supra note 77, at 38 (“A common feature 
of the new devices described above is that they do not have any sanctions or coercive 
power to compel enforcement.”); id. at 40 (“In short, there are no means to compel an 
answer or guarantee a truthful answer.”). 
 80. See Goodman, Japan, supra note 9, at 572–73, 577–78. 
 81. See Miki, supra note 77, at 42 (“[J]udges are expected to be investigators under 
the continental procedural system. Usually they do not hesitate to make inquiries of the 
parties in order to clarify issues and to request the production of evidence that they deem 
essential to the case.”). 
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has not advanced the process much beyond the pre-1996 Code situa-
tion.82 
E. Production of Documents—Changes with the New Code 
Civil law judges have the ability to require a party to produce docu-
ments and other evidence that is essential to reach a fair decision.83 The 
Old Code gave this authority to Japanese judges—but limited its use in 
several important respects. It is in this area that the 1996 Code made sev-
eral changes. This section reviews the limitations on this authority in the 
Old Code and as a counterpoint, discusses the changes wrought in the 
1996 Code. 
First, the procedure contemplated in the Old Code was not (and still is 
not) discovery. Unlike the American system where parties ask questions 
of each other in order to discover the existence of relevant documents or 
demand documents to ascertain relevance, the Old Code required that a 
party know of the existence of a document before asking a judge to have 
a party produce it.84 Thus, a party requesting a document through a judge 
had to provide specific information concerning the document, including a 
justification for production that meant, or at least implied, that the re-
questing party must know what the document said before asking for it.85 
These procedural requirements of the Old Code inhibited production. 
The 1996 Code retained the specificity requirements for document re-
quests,86 but added provisions making it easier for a requesting party to 
                                                                                                             
 82. Bengoshi also use the Japanese procedure for preservation of evidence in their 
attempt to discover documents. See MINSOHŌ, art. 234–42. If a court is convinced that 
evidence must be preserved, it may order the evidence produced for preservation pur-
poses. The preservation motion can be made before a suit is filed, so the mechanism may 
operate like discovery. However, it is not designed for discovery purposes and the re-
questing party must make a compelling case for preservation—something that can be 
achieved if a witness is likely to die soon or leave the country, or evidence is likely to be 
destroyed in the immediate future unless preserved. In these cases, preservation has been 
used (although rarely) to actually discover what a witness has to say or to otherwise dis-
close facts. Nonetheless, the process is discretionary with the court and the burden on the 
party seeking preservation is high, even in the few situations where preservation may be 
required. It has limited value as a discovery device. See GOODMAN, JUSTICE, supra note 
19, at 258–61 (discussing preservation of evidence under the 1996 Code). 
 83. See MINSOHŌ, art. 219–23. See also Hazard, supra note 16, at 1028 (“The letter of 
procedural law in the civil law regimes is that the judiciary is responsible for obtaining 
evidence, a responsibility that could not be delegated. It is a responsibility that certainly 
could not be delegated to partisan advocates for litigation parties.”). 
 84. See KYŪ-MINSOHŌ, art. 313. 
 85. See id. art. 313, paras. 1–5. 
 86. See MINSOHŌ, art. 221; MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU, art. 140 (regarding motions for 
production orders). 
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identify the desired documents when specifying the content of the docu-
ment was not possible. As the theoretical basis for the requirement was 
to make it possible for the producing party to know what document was 
being sought, the 1996 Code merely required that the requestor furnish 
sufficient information to allow the holder to identify the desired docu-
ment.87 Then, the holder of the document would provide the necessary 
specification.88 
Second, under the Old Code, the obligation to produce a document was 
coextensive with a witness’s requirement to testify; consequently, if a 
document was privileged, it was not subject to production.89 The 1996 
Code modified this requirement by allowing the judge to review privi-
leged documents in camera and to order production of the requested ma-
terials in redacted form.90 
Third, production was limited to narrow circumstances in the Old 
Code. Thus, the Old Code allowed a judge to order production in only 
three situations: 
 
(i) where the party possessing the document was rely-
ing on the document in the case, but had not yet 
produced the document;91 
 
(ii) where the requesting party had a right to the docu-
ment under some substantive law;92 or 
 
(iii) where the document had been created as a conse-
quence of a relationship between the parties (a “re-
lationship document”) or was created for the benefit 
of the requesting party (a “benefit document”).93 
 
Some Japanese judges, urged on by plaintiffs’ lawyers, broadly inter-
preted the third requirement to avoid the restricted nature of these cate-
gories. Thus, what was considered a relationship document or a benefit 
                                                                                                             
 87. See MINSOHŌ, art. 222, para. 1. 
 88. See id. art. 222, para. 2. 
 89. See KYŪ-MINSOHŌ, arts. 280–81; Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 294 (explaining 
coextensive witness testimony and document production obligations under the Old 
Code). 
 90. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223, para. 1, 223, para. 3; MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU, art. 141. 
Where the holder of the document is a non-party, the court may question the holder be-
fore ordering production and/or redaction. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223, para. 2. 
 91. See KYŪ-MINSOHŌ, art. 312, para. 1. 
 92. See id. art. 312, para. 2. 
 93. See id. art. 312, para. 3. 
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document was given a broad interpretation by some lower court judges. 
Other judges saw this expansive reading of the Old Code as inconsistent 
with the real meaning of the limitations. To cabin the expansive reading 
of the Old Code, these judges adopted a rule under which a document 
prepared solely for the use of the possessor of the document (i.e., a self-
use document) could not also be considered a relationship document or a 
benefit document.94 
Fourth, there was no provision in the Old Code allowing the judge to 
order the government to produce documents. Thus, documents in the 
possession of a government agency were unavailable in private litigation. 
Reformers of the Old Code could not avoid dealing with these four 
limitations. On one hand, plaintiffs’ lawyers wanted a major rewriting of 
the production rules to allow for production beyond that allowed by the 
Old Code.95 On the other hand, lawyers who represented corporate inter-
ests (typical defendants) were quite happy with the status quo.96 The 
government, for its part, was hesitant about having to produce docu-
ments, especially when it thought the national interest (or at least the 
government’s interest) could be harmed by production. The 1996 Code 
sought a compromise. This compromise took final form in article 220.97 
The 1996 amendments resolved the government’s complaint by post-
poning to a later date the terms under which the government could be 
ordered to produce documents. To satisfy those demanding a provision 
requiring that the government could be compelled to produce, the 1996 
Code made clear that an amendment to that end would be forthcoming (a 
two-year period was provided).98 In due course, an amendment was en-
                                                                                                             
 94. For a discussion of lower courts’ efforts to expand production and the correspond-
ing effort of other courts to limit it through the judicial creation of the self-use exception, 
see Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 290–93; Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 776–78; Harada, 
supra note 67, at 43–48; Kojima, supra note 12, at 702–03. See also KUO-CHANG 
HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW 176–89 (2003). 
 95. See Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 296 (explaining that the Old Code’s document 
production provisions gave insufficient access to individual plaintiffs bringing suits 
against corporations and the government). 
 96. See id. at 299 (explaining that corporations favored a plan narrower than the New 
Code); Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 776–78. 
 97. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220. 
 98. As adopted, the 1996 Code provided that an investigation would be undertaken 
and an amendment to deal with the issue of documents in the government’s possession 
would be submitted within approximately two years of June 26, 1996, the date on which 
the 1996 Code was promulgated. 
[A] compromise was worked out between the Government and the Diet, in 
which the bill was amended as follows: (4)(b) was dropped (Art.220(4)) and a 
provision was added to the chapter of transitory provisions to the effect that the 
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acted that authorized a court to direct the government to produce docu-
ments, except where it would hinder performance of the public duty, 
harm the public interest, or disclose a government secret.99 In addition, 
production should be denied if it would be likely to harm national secu-
rity, damage the relationship between Japan and a foreign country or in-
ternational organization, or prejudice the government in negotiations 
with a foreign power or international organization.100 Once a party makes 
a motion to have the government produce a document, the court, unless it 
finds the reasons for production given by the requestor clearly unreason-
able, must confer with the appropriate government official concerning 
the request.101 The government is then given an opportunity to present its 
opinions as to why production is exempted under the law.102 
Article 220 took account of the arguments made by defendants’ law-
yers by retaining the three limited categories pursuant to which docu-
ments could be produced.103 In this sense, it left the Old Code un-
changed. But to account for the desires of plaintiffs’ lawyers, the 1996 
Code contained a catch-all provision allowing production of virtually any 
document.104 To contain this open-ended production category, the 1996 
Code limited the production of any other document by providing that 
certain categories of such documents not be produced.105 Among these 
categories was the self-use document106 (i.e., a document prepared solely 
for the use of the party in possession of the document), thereby meeting 
                                                                                                             
Government must further consider the matter to come up with an appropriate 
conclusion within two years in keeping consistency with the system of the pub-
lic access to the government documents currently in deliberation. 
Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 777. 
 99. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(b). 
 100. See id. art. 223, para. 4(1). 
 101. See id. art. 223. 
 102. See id. art. 220, para. 4(b), art. 223. 
 103. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, paras. 1–3. 
 104. See id. art. 220, para. 4. 
 105. See id. art. 220, paras. 4(a)–4(c). Professor Mochizuki describes the compromise 
as follows:  
Article 220[] begins with a restatement into modern written Japanese of the 
three clauses of Article 312 of the Old Code. Clause 4, however, states that 
people must also produce documents that are not covered by the first three 
clauses, so long as one of four exceptions does not apply.  
See Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 299. 
 106. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(c). 
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the desire of defendants’ counsel that the self-use exception be made a 
part of the 1996 Code.107 
Scholarly opinion as to the effect of these code changes varied, al-
though there was general consensus that the changes would lead to a shift 
in judicial approach as to the presumption of production, and conse-
quently, a narrowing of the scope of the judicially created self-use doc-
trine. Nonetheless, the Justice Ministry handbook on the 1996 amend-
ments took a position that is similar to the test for self-use documents 
under the Old Code: 
[W]hether a document is a Clause 4 self-use document will turn on 
whether it “was created solely for internal use and is not expected to be 
shown to unrelated outsiders, considering the totality of circumstances 
such as the content of the document, and the process by and reason for 
which the document was created and is now possessed by its current 
possessor.”108 
An intriguing question was the effect the structure of the 1996 Code 
production provision would have on the meaning of a benefit document 
or a relationship document. From a purely grammatical point of view, the 
categories that had given rise to the self-use exception were not included 
in the language limiting production on the basis of self-use status. Yet it 
could be argued that the language of the 1996 Code was meant to place 
relationship and benefit documents back into the narrow category they 
had occupied before some courts broadly interpreted them as produc-
ible.109 Such broad—some would say strained—interpretation was no 
longer necessary, as any document could be ordered for production.110 
                                                                                                             
 107. See Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 302 (“[O]pponents of generalizing the duty to 
produce wanted documents covered by the old self-use exception to be similarly pro-
tected under the new law . . . .”). 
 108. Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 302 (quoting ICHIMON ITTO SHIN MINJI SOSHO HO 
[QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] 252 (Counsellor’s 
Office, Civil Affairs Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Justice ed., 1996)). See also Tanigu-
chi, supra note 12, at 778. 
 109. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 110. See Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 299–301 (“Uncertainty about the breadth of the 
self use exceptions raises questions about the New Code’s commitment to greater access 
to information.”). In addition to the exceptions to production mentioned above, the Code 
also applies the various privileges that apply to oral testimony to documents. See 
MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(b). Privileges in Japan are somewhat broader than the privi-
leges in the United States, and include privileges for pharmacists, midwives, and foreign 
lawyers licensed to give foreign legal advice in Japan, as well as a privilege for trade and 
professional secrets. See MINSOHŌ, art. 197. In addition, although not designated a “privi-
lege,” a witness may not be asked questions that embarrass the witness. MINJI SOSH-O 
KISOHU, art. 115. How broadly a judge will interpret embarrassment remains to be seen 
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In sum, by attempting to meet the objections and requirements of all 
parties, the language of article 220 of the 1996 Code set the stage for ju-
dicial interpretation of the meaning of the document production require-
ment, especially the statutory self-use exception. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT’S 
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
A. The First Judicial Interpretation of Self-Use: Fuji Bank v. Maeda 
Litigation concerning the meaning of the document production provi-
sions followed on the heels of the 1996 Code, which took effect in 1998. 
The Supreme Court rendered its first decision dealing with the meaning 
of the 1996 Code’s document production provisions in November 1999 
with Fuji Bank.111 The plaintiff was the family of a debtor who had killed 
himself when he was unable to repay loans he spent speculating in the 
stock market.112 The defendant was the banking institution that had lent 
him the money.113 The document sought was an internal bank document 
prepared because the loan amount exceeded the branch bank’s lending 
authority.114 
The debtor’s family argued that the lending bank owed a duty to the 
borrower when the bank was aware or should have been aware that the 
borrower had no assets to repay the loan and thus, the bank should have 
refused to extend the loan.115 The family sought damages for breach of 
this duty, arguing that it was the proximate cause of the suicide.116 To 
establish its case, the family asked the court to order the bank to produce 
the internal bank documents used to determine whether a loan should be 
granted.117 Such internal documents were required by the bank’s home 
office because the size of the loan exceeded the local branch manager’s 
lending authority.118 The plaintiff argued that the documents would dis-
                                                                                                             
but it is not unreasonable to conclude that questions to an executive of a company that 
would elicit responses embarrassing to the company would run afoul of article 115. 
 111. See Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 MINSHŪ 1787 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1999), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1999.11.12-1999-kyo-No.2 
.html. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 MINSHŪ 1787 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1999), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1999.11.12-1999-kyo-No.2 
.html. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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close that bank officials were aware of the decedent’s precarious finan-
cial position and that some of them had urged that they reject the applica-
tion because the decedent would be unable to repay,119 which would es-
tablish that the bank was aware of the risks to the decedent and accord-
ingly owed a duty to the decedent not to extend credit.120 
The document was the bank’s internal document containing the advice 
and opinions of bank executives that was relevant to the case. The issue 
before the court was whether the document was a self-use document ex-
empt from production under the 1996 Code. The Tokyo High Court held 
that the document was not a self-use document and ordered its produc-
tion.121 On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and held 
that the document was exempt from production.122 
The Supreme Court reasoned that: (i) the document was prepared for 
the internal use; (ii) the bank did not intend to allow others outside the 
company to ever view the document; and (iii) the bank would suffer 
harm if the document was produced because in future situations persons 
within the company would be afraid to present their views in an open and 
forthright matter out of concern that their opinions would later be sub-
jected to public scrutiny.123 What appears to have been of greatest con-
cern to the Court was that production might inhibit the free flow of in-
formation and views within the company, causing damage to the deci-
sion-making process.124 Accordingly, the Court held that the document 
was a self-use document, and in the absence of some special circum-
stance, was not subject to production.125 Since no special circumstance 
was shown, the High Court’s production order was reversed.126 
Several things about the decision are of importance. First, although 
there are some differences regarding the proper translation of the self-use 
exception in the 1996 Code, the translations make it clear that to be a 
self-use document, the document must have been intended only for the 
                                                                                                             
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 MINSHŪ 1787 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1999), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1999.11.12-1999-kyo-No.2 
.html. 
 122. Id. Under article 223, paragraph 7 of the 1996 Code, a ruling granting or denying 
a motion for production is subject to immediate interlocutory appeal, known as a kokoku 
appeal. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223, para. 7. 
 123. Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 MINSHŪ 1787 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1999), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1999.11.12-1999-kyo-No.2 
.html. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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use of the holder of the document (and it seems reasonably clear that 
such a holder would have been the preparer of the document—thus it was 
prepared solely for the use of the preparer-holder).127 The statutory lan-
guage contains no other requirements for a document to be an excluded 
self-use document.128 Yet the Supreme Court in Fuji Bank makes it clear 
that a self-use document is not shielded from production merely because 
it was prepared for the exclusive use of the preparer-holder of the docu-
ment.129 In addition to meeting the statutory definition of a self-use 
document, the document will only be exempted from disclosure if disclo-
sure “is likely to cause disadvantage” to the preparer-holder.130 
Second, the Supreme Court’s opinion takes the position that even if a 
document is a self-use document whose production will cause disadvan-
tage to the holder, the Court may nonetheless order its production if there 
are “special circumstances.”131 The 1996 Code does not reference or de-
fine “special circumstances,” and the Court in Fuji Bank likewise failed 
to define “special circumstances,” even when it introduced the con-
cept.132 
Having decided that the document fell within the self-use exception, 
the Supreme Court also noted that it was clear that the document was not 
producible under the provision of the 1996 Code governing relationship 
documents, article 220, paragraph 3.133 The Court did not explain why a 
self-use document could not also be a relationship document, although 
the opinion implied that a self-use document, by definition, could not be 
                                                                                                             
 127. See Case No. 35 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2709 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No.. 
35.html (“[a]ny document for the exclusive use of the holder of the document”); Case  
No. 14 of 2004, 58 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 26, 2004), translation available  
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 128. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4. 
 129. See Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 MINSHŪ 1787 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1999), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1999.11.12-1999-kyo-No. 
2.html. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. However, on the facts in Fuji Bank, the Court found that special circumstances 
did not exist and thus refused to order production. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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a relationship document.134 As the grammatical structure of article 220 
appears to limit the self-use exception to the catch-all category of docu-
ments, this implication may be important.135 It would appear that the self-
use exception would, in fact, also apply to relationship documents 
through an indirect mechanism; that is, by limiting the definition of rela-
tionship documents so that a document must fail the self-use exception as 
a necessary condition for relationship status. 
B. The Aftermath of Fuji Bank 
Four months after the Fuji Bank decision was issued, the Court had an-
other opportunity to discuss document production.136 The plaintiff in this 
case was a purchaser of telephone communications equipment who 
sought damages after the equipment failed to operate properly, making 
communication through use of the equipment impossible.137 To establish 
its case that the equipment was defective, the plaintiff sought production 
of schematic drawings of the equipment, relying on the catch-all provi-
sion of article 220.138 The defendant objected to production on two 
grounds. First, article 220, paragraph 4(b), by incorporating the testimo-
nial privilege applicable to trade and professional secrets, exempts from 
the catch-all category documents that record professional or technical 
secrets.139 Second, the defendant claimed that the schematic was created 
solely for the internal use of the company, i.e., it was a self-use docu-
ment.140 The Osaka High Court refused to order production.141 The Su-
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 135. The catch-all provision is article 220, paragraph 4. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4. 
 136. See Case No. 20 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 1073 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 10, 2000), translation 
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 139. See Case No. 20 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 1073 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 10, 2000), translation 
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preme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine 
whether the documents were exempt from production. 142 
As an initial matter, the Court found that merely because the document 
related to a product that defendant manufactured and contained informa-
tion concerning the product, it was not ipso facto a trade secret docu-
ment.143 To make a document a trade or professional secret document, 
the possessor needs to establish that production of the document would 
disadvantage her in some fashion.144 The risk that competitors might see 
the document does not itself amount to disadvantage.145 In short, to be a 
professional or trade secret document, disclosure must somehow disad-
vantage the profession or otherwise adversely affect the party trying to 
keep the document secret.146 The matter was remanded for the High 
Court to consider whether the document in fact contained secrets within 
the Fuji Bank definition.147 
In dealing with the defendant’s second claim, the Court reaffirmed its 
statement in Fuji Bank that to be a self-use document, the possessor must 
show that: (i) the document had been prepared solely for the use of the 
possessor; (ii) the document was never intended for disclosure to others; 
and (iii) production would cause disadvantage to the possessor.148 In Fuji 
Bank, the defendant bank was able to show that it would be injured by 
production.149 However, in the instant case, no such showing had been 
made.150 The High Court was satisfied that it was a self-use document 
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simply because the document was made for the sole use of the com-
pany.151 The High Court failed to consider whether any disadvantage 
would result to the holder of the document if the document was pro-
duced.152 Without a finding of such injury, the document could not auto-
matically be considered outside the catch-all category on the ground that 
it was a self-use document.153 The matter was remanded for further pro-
ceedings.154 
In December 2000, the Court had another chance to refine its Fuji 
Bank holding.155 In this case, the Supreme Court reversed a ruling by the 
High Court of Tokyo that ordered a defendant credit union to produce a 
document regarding a loan in a stockholder’s derivative suit.156 The 
stockholder argued that the directors had made certain loans with inade-
quate security, and hence, had breached their duty to the corporation.157 
The stockholder requested internal documents of the credit union relating 
to the making of the loans, claiming that the documents would disclose 
the alleged breach of fiduciary duty.158 The credit union opposed produc-
tion, arguing that the documents had been prepared solely for the use of 
the credit union, and thus were self-use documents not subject to produc-
tion.159 
The Tokyo High Court reasoned that although the documents may not 
have been created with an intent to distribute them outside the credit un-
ion, since the documents contained information concerning loans and the 
actions of the directors thereto, the company should have known that, in 
the event of a derivative lawsuit, the document could be produced as evi-
dence.160 The High Court seemed particularly concerned with the avail-
ability of company documents to shareholders in a derivative suit—after 
all, the shareholders own the company and a derivative action is brought 
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against directors for the benefit of the corporation, which is the holder of 
the document.161 
Upon review of the Tokyo High Court’s ruling, the Supreme Court ma-
jority held that “special circumstances” justifying production were not 
met merely because the documents were sought in a derivative suit.162 To 
qualify as a “special circumstance” within the meaning of Fuji Bank, the 
requestor of the credit union documents would have to show that it was 
“in a position identifiable with that of a credit association or the holder of 
the document.”163 Although stockholders may have a right to inspect cer-
tain documents pursuant to substantive law that gives them access to 
such documents (e.g., articles of incorporation, minutes of directors’ 
meetings, certain financial statements, etc.), the substantive law also lim-
its the documents a stockholder is entitled to obtain.164 In addition, while 
stockholders bringing a derivative suit may be in a position identifiable 
with that of the credit union by virtue of the fact that any recovery flows 
to the credit union, because the statutes limit the documents available to 
stockholders (and there is no statutory exception for stockholder-
plaintiffs in a derivative case), stockholders are not in a position identifi-
able with that of the credit union itself.165 Hence, no “special circum-
stance” existed.166 A stockholder who brings a derivative suit is no more 
entitled to internal decision-making documents (that are not made avail-
able by substantive law) than is any other litigant.167 While the action 
was instituted on behalf of the corporation, a derivative plaintiff is not 
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the corporation and is not entitled to documents created solely for the 
benefit of the corporation.168 As an aside, the Court again noted that the 
self-use document cannot be considered a relationship document.169 
Justice Machida Akira (who became Chief Justice in 2002) dis-
sented.170 In his view, while the documents sought were self-use docu-
ments, the fact that they were sought in a derivative suit and contained 
relevant information regarding whether there had been a breach of trust, 
created the special circumstances required to override the self-use excep-
tion.171 The documents’ role in assuring consensus decision-making 
within the company gave them a fundamental role in assuring that the 
decision-making process complied with the duty of trust the directors 
owed to the corporation.172 Accordingly, he believed the documents 
should be produced in a derivative suit.173 
In another derivative suit decided on the same day, the Court based its 
decision on a matter of standing, not on the merits of the case.174 The 
Court upheld a decision of the Tokyo High Court, which had ordered a 
credit union to produce documents in a derivative suit against direc-
tors.175 The directors appealed the production order, but the credit union 
did not.176 The Supreme Court held that only the possessor of docu-
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ments—here, the credit union—had standing to appeal an order requiring 
production, and only a party seeking production could appeal an order 
refusing production.177 As the directors did not fit either category, they 
lacked standing to appeal the order to produce.178 
A year later, in December 2001, the Supreme Court again contem-
plated whether a credit union’s internal document was subject to produc-
tion.179 In this litigation, the debtor-plaintiff claimed that the credit union 
was at fault in its dealings with him, and as a consequence, there should 
be no liability under the debt.180 What distinguishes this decision from 
the previous cases was that the original creator of the document was nei-
ther possessor of the document nor a party in the case. Rather, the credit 
union had failed and all of its assets had been sold to a company that had 
the job of liquidating assets of failed credit unions for the benefit of the 
Japanese Government’s equivalent of the United States Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation.181 
This successor corporation filed suit to recover on the debt, and the 
debtors set up a defense of unlawful conduct by the original lender.182 To 
prove their contention, the debtors asked for documents that they claimed 
would show improper conduct in connection with the loan by the original 
lender.183 The successor corporation, which was in possession of the 
documents, argued that the documents were similar to the documents in 
the Fuji Bank case because they contained the opinions of firm employ-
ees and had been prepared solely for use inside the firm.184 Thus, they 
                                                                                                             
2000.-Kyo-.No.17.html. Why the credit union did not object and file an appeal is not 
stated in the Supreme Court opinion. 
 177. See Case No. 36 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2743 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No.. 
36.html. 
 178. See 54 MINSHŪ 2743 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000) (“[B]ecause the kokoku appellant 
is not the holder ordered to produce the document but merely a party concerned in a case 
as to the merits, not having the standing to lodge complaint against the original decision, 
this kokoku appeal should inevitably be dismissed as unlawful.”). 
 179. See Case No. 15 of 2001, 55 MINSHŪ 1411 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 7, 2001), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2001.12.07-2001-Kyo-No. 
15.html. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Case No. 15 of 2001, 55 MINSHŪ 1411 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 7, 2001), translation  
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2001.12.07-2001-Kyo-No. 
15.html. 
2007] CONTEXT, CULTURE, COMMUNITY 157 
were self-use documents not subject to production.185 The Osaka High 
Court, however, ordered the defendant to produce the documents.186 
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s production order and 
dismissed the appeal.187 The Court reasoned that the original lender, 
which had created the documents sought in the action, was no longer in 
the lending business and was in the process of liquidation.188 Accord-
ingly, it was no longer going to make any loans.189 Further, the possessor 
of the documents, the successor company, might make loans in the fu-
ture, but its opinions and the opinions of its employees would not be ad-
versely affected by the production of documents created by the original 
lender.190 Unlike Fuji Bank, production would not inhibit communication 
and decision making inside the possessor company. Accordingly, the 
Court found that special circumstances existed that warranted the pro-
duction of these documents.191 The Court made no reference to the ques-
tion of employee privacy.192 
In a similar case, when an insurance company failed and the responsi-
ble government authority directed the administrators to appoint a special 
independent committee to report on the role of former directors in the 
company’s failure, the resulting report was not considered a self-use 
document.193 In the main suit, which was between insurance companies, 
the defendant, a failed company, was charged with obtaining funds from 
the plaintiff based on fraudulent financial statements.194 To establish its 
case, the plaintiff sought production of a copy of the investigative com-
mittee’s report.195 The report concluded that there was reason to believe 
that there had been wrongdoing on the part of past management and rec-
ommended suit against former directors.196 The company administrator 
possessing the report objected to production, claiming that the report was 
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a self-use document.197 The company administrator also argued that be-
cause opinions of lawyers on the committee were set out in the report, it 
was exempt from production because of attorney-client privilege.198 Both 
the Tokyo High Court and the Supreme Court rejected these arguments 
and ordered production.199 
It was the view of the Court that the report, prepared for the failed 
company’s administrators at the demand of the government agency su-
pervising insurance companies, was not in the nature of a company-
prepared document.200 Moreover, the administrators had been appointed 
by the same governmental body in order to protect policy holders.201 The 
report was prepared for the same public interest purpose, and thus was 
not prepared solely for the benefit of the failed company or its adminis-
trators.202 The Court also concluded that although lawyers were members 
of the committee, they had not been engaged to provide legal advice or 
services, so no attorney-client privilege was involved.203 
Up through 2004, although the Supreme Court did not define “special 
and unusual circumstances,” it found them to exist where there was a 
lack of standing to complain about production, where the creator of the 
document was no longer in business, and where the document was cre-
ated for a public interest purpose. Still, the thrust of the Fuji Bank case, 
as reaffirmed by the Court’s refusal to order production in a derivative 
suit, led the Japanese bar and lower court judges to conclude that little 
had changed as a consequence of the 1996 amendment.204 
C. Movement Away from the Strict Application of the Fuji Bank Holding 
The prospect of change emerged in 2005. In a series of cases, the Su-
preme Court has clarified the requirements of the self-use exception to 
production and has more clearly defined when special circumstances ex-
ist that require document production. Although the most recent cases 
have relaxed the production rules, the basic reasoning of Fuji Bank ap-
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pears to remain intact: documents of an ongoing business entity will be 
considered self-use documents exempt from production if the documents 
are prepared for decision-making purposes solely for examination within 
the entity, and production might interfere with the free flow of informa-
tion. That said, while the party seeking the exception bears the burden of 
showing that production will cause injury, the party requesting produc-
tion still faces a difficult task when seeking what American lawyers 
would call a smoking-gun document—a document disclosing wrongdo-
ing on the part of the possessor entity. 
In July 2005, the Supreme Court upheld a debtor’s claim for money 
damages based on an emotional injury suffered when a lender refused to 
make available financial records concerning the loans between them.205 
The debtor needed the records to work out an arrangement with his credi-
tors.206 In this case, the possessor of the document was a lender licensed 
to do business under the Money Lending Business Law (“MLBL”).207 
The borrower had engaged in a series of transactions with the lender over 
a period of time and had made numerous payments in connection with 
the loans.208 Under the substantive law, the maximum rate of interest 
payable on the loans was fixed. 209 The debtor was unable to continue 
payments on the loans and engaged counsel to consolidate and make an 
arrangement for the payment of his debts.210 Counsel, in turn, asked the 
lender to produce the records of the various loans and payments made in 
connection therewith, in an attempt to show that the rate of interest 
charged to the debtor exceeded the maximum rate allowed by the law.211 
The lender, while willing to discuss an arrangement for future repay-
ment, was unwilling to produce the books.212 The debtor’s representa-
tives were unwilling to discuss an arrangement until the records of prior 
transactions had been produced.213 The debtor filed suit alleging that the 
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interest rate charged exceeded the rate permitted by law, and that the 
lender’s refusal to produce the records prior to the suit had caused the 
debtor injury by impeding him from arranging for the payment of his 
debts.214 Damages were sought for the emotional harm this allegedly 
caused the debtor. In the litigation, the lender produced the records.215 
With respect to the plaintiff’s first claim, the High Court found that 
there had been overpayments and ordered the lender to make restitution 
for overpayment of interest.216 With respect to plaintiff’s second claim, 
alleging emotional injury, the High Court found that such relief was only 
available if it could be said that there had been a breach of good faith by 
the lender that had caused the non-pecuniary injury to the debtor.217 The 
High Court found that there was no obligation for the lender to produce 
the records.218 As the debtor and his representatives had not disclosed 
that failure to make production was delaying the arrangement for pay-
ment of creditors and was having an adverse emotional effect, there was 
no basis for the debtor’s claim that the lender’s conduct was such a gross 
violation of the duty of good faith.219 Critical to the High Court’s reason-
ing was that there was no statutory duty on the part of the lender to pro-
duce the record of prior transactions.220 
The plaintiff appealed this finding as to the second claim, and the Su-
preme Court rejected the lower court’s reasoning.221 The Supreme Court 
found that, under the MLBL, the lender was required to keep records of 
loans, repayments, and interest paid, and to provide copies to the debtor 
when payments were made.222 The Court found that it was unreasonable 
to believe that even sophisticated debtors would not at some point lose or 
otherwise not have copies of some of these records.223 The Court also 
concluded that the purpose of requiring the lender to keep records was, at 
least in part, to have records available to resolve disputes that might arise 
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between the lender and debtor.224 The Court noted that this conclusion 
was supported by the Financial Services Agency guidelines, which re-
quire lenders make details of debt available to debtors.225 
Thus, the Court concluded that the lender was required to produce re-
cords requested by a debtor attempting to work out an arrangement with 
creditors.226 Moreover, the Court reasoned that no great burden would be 
placed on the lender if it were required to produce the records from its 
books, whereas great disadvantage would result to the borrower if denied 
access to such records.227 The Court viewed this obligation as part of the 
lender’s duty of good faith under the loan agreement, and unless there 
was an abuse of right by the debtor, production was required.228 Since the 
lender had unlawfully refused the debtor’s request over a period of six 
months, the debtor had a right to recover non-pecuniary relief.229 The 
case was remanded to the Osaka High Court for a determination of the 
damages to be awarded.230 
Although the above case did not directly involve an issue under article 
220 of the 1996 Code, its holding is nonetheless relevant. The 1996 Code 
requires, as did its predecessor, that a party to litigation produce any 
document to which the requesting party has a right under substantive 
law.231 In determining that a debtor could base a claim for non-pecuniary 
relief on the failure of a lender doing business under the MLBL to make 
available copies of records to a debtor, the Court also established a 
debtor’s right in similar litigation to request production of the records 
under the 1996 Code. As the MLBL did not specifically state that such 
records were to be made available to debtors—the Court reached this 
conclusion based on agency guidelines, the purpose of the law, and the 
relative harms caused by production and non-production—this case may 
be viewed as broadening the scope of production under the 1996 Code.232 
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Three days after the Third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court decided 
the above case and held that borrowers were entitled to production of the 
records of their loan from a licensed lender, the Second Petty Bench de-
cided a case which dealt with documents from a police investigation.233 
Here, the Tokyo High Court held that the documents that formed the ba-
sis for a search warrant constituted documents regarding the legal rela-
tionship between the subject of the warrant and the police, and hence 
were documents that could be ordered produced by the police under the 
document production section of the 1996 Code, absent other legal provi-
sions limiting production.234 Although the Supreme Court found that 
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure inhibited production, and 
thus refused to order production of most of the materials sought,235 in an 
expansive reading of the 1996 Code, the Court reasoned that the underly-
ing documents upon which the search was authorized were relationship 
documents.236 
The production issue in this case arose in a lawsuit brought by the sub-
jects of a series of searches made in connection with an arson attack on 
the home of a Prefectural Assembly Member.237 The plaintiffs sought 
production of the warrant allowing the search, as well as numerous un-
derlying documents. The subjects of the search were not arrested for the 
crime—indeed, no arrests had been made—and argued that the govern-
ment was responsible for damages in connection with the search and sei-
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zure under the provisions of Japan’s Constitution that render the state 
responsible for unlawful acts of its agents.238 
The criminal investigation into the arson was ongoing at the time of the 
Supreme Court’s decision. The Tokyo High Court ordered all of the re-
quested documents be produced. Although the Supreme Court concurred 
that the materials involved were relationship documents, it refused to 
order production of most materials because of the ongoing investiga-
tion.239 
The Supreme Court found that the search and seizure constituted a le-
gal relationship between the police and the subject of the search.240 This 
followed from the constitutional provisions requiring a warrant for a 
search and making citizens and their effects secure in their homes.241 
This constitutionally protected security could only be breached pursuant 
to a warrant.242 Thus, the warrant and its execution created a legal rela-
tionship between the police and the subject of the search.243 The papers 
allowing this legal relationship to be created, i.e., the warrant and the 
underlying documents on which the issuance of the warrant were based, 
were documents concerning the legal relations between the holder of the 
document (the police or prosecutor) and the requesting party (the subject 
of the search).244 
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Since the documents in their entirety were subject to production under 
the 1996 Code, the Court next examined whether there were any other 
legal provisions that exempted the materials from production.245 As to 
the warrants, it found none.246 As a matter of law, the warrants must be 
shown to the subject of the search at the time of the search, and therefore 
it was an abuse of discretion for the police and prosecutor to claim that 
the material contained in the warrant was confidential.247 A further 
ground for rejecting the State’s argument was that the warrant contained 
information already known to the subject of the search, i.e., the name of 
the search subject and the address of the residence.248 As to the docu-
ments underlying the warrants, the Court found that the provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure Code that protected information concerning an ongo-
ing investigation from disclosure formed a basis for refusing produc-
tion.249 It was not outside the realm of police discretion to claim that con-
fidentiality was required, so the materials were exempted from produc-
tion.250 
This case makes clear that a relationship document need not be a docu-
ment prepared between the parties, such as a contract.251 The documents 
underlying the search warrant were prepared solely by the police authori-
ties for the purpose of presentation to a court, and surely were not de-
signed to create a legal relationship, as traditionally understood, between 
the police who prepared them and the search suspect.252 Surely the police 
did not intend to find themselves engaged in a legal relationship with 
suspects to a crime any more than a prosecutor considers himself as hav-
ing a legal relationship with an accused. In this sense, the willingness of 
the Court to broadly interpret what is a legal relationship document may 
have significance. On the other hand, it may be that the case is limited to 
documents underlying arrest and search—matters specifically covered by 
the Constitution and where the criminal law likely prohibits any mean-
ingful production in any event. 
On the same day as the decision in the search and seizure case, the 
Second Petty Bench of the Supreme Court delivered an opinion regard-
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ing the scope of production permitted against the government when the 
documents sought might affect the foreign relations of Japan.253 As pre-
viously noted, the original rewrite of the document production provisions 
of the 1996 Code failed to resolve the issue of how documents possessed 
by the government are treated.254 In a subsequent amendment, govern-
ment documents were made subject to production, but were limited in 
certain respects. Documents exempt from production include those that 
could harm the foreign relations of Japan, harm national security, or ad-
versely affect negotiations between Japan and a foreign country or inter-
national organization.255 
In addition, a procedural safeguard was established to give the gov-
ernment a means of objecting to production of documents, although it 
was subject to judicial review. A court considering a production request 
for potentially prohibited materials must give the government authority 
an opportunity to express a reasoned view as to whether production 
should be prohibited.256 The court must review the rationale to determine 
its validity. If it finds the government’s reasons inadequate, the court 
may order production.257 
The boundaries of production of government documents were explored 
in a case where a citizen of Pakistan sought political asylum in Japan.258 
The foreign citizen claimed he was the subject of political retribution and 
that there was a warrant for his arrest in Pakistan.259 To support his 
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claim, the foreign citizen presented papers to the Minister of Justice, in-
cluding a copy of the arrest warrant from his home country.260 The Min-
ister of Justice wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and requested 
that contact be made with the Pakistani government to determine the va-
lidity of the documents.261 The Pakistani government responded to the 
inquiry by stating that the arrest and other documents were forgeries.262 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs then notified the Justice Ministry and 
refugee status was denied.263 
To challenge this outcome, the foreign citizen sought production of: (i) 
a copy of the initial request from the Minister of Justice to the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs (which was in the possession of the Ministry of Jus-
tice); and (ii) copies of the correspondence between the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs and the foreign government (which were in the possession 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).264 Both Ministers objected to produc-
tion on the grounds that production would harm relations between Japan 
and a foreign power.265 Further, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opined 
that the documents exchanged between the governments were generally 
considered confidential in customary diplomatic relations, and thus 
should not be produced.266 Both Ministers also claimed that the docu-
ments were exempt from production because they contained state secrets; 
production would harm the public interest and interfere with the per-
formance of public duties. The Tokyo High Court, without conducting an 
in camera review, ordered the documents produced. The Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded for an examination into the validity of the claims 
made by the Ministers.267 
The Supreme Court noted that the question of production involved not 
simply whether the ultimate fact disclosed by the correspondence was 
secret (i.e., that the foreign government said that the documents provided 
to the Japanese government by the alleged refugee were forgeries), but 
whether production of the material as a whole would harm diplomatic 
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relations and disclose state secrets.268 In this regard, the Supreme Court 
noted that the Ministers claimed that production of the documents would 
disclose internal investigative techniques, background information not 
provided to the foreign government, and comments about internal politi-
cal matters in the foreign country, all of which would damage the public 
interest if disclosed.269 Because the High Court had neither examined the 
documents in camera nor adequately reviewed the Ministry’s rationale, 
the matter was remanded for a more thorough examination.270 
Although concurring to the remand, Justices Takii and Imai seemed to 
sympathize with the Tokyo High Court.271 In their view, the Ministry 
may not simply rely on generalities or speculative injury to the public 
interest to support a denial of production.272 Rather, the objection to pro-
duction must provide concrete reasons why production would cause the 
public interest to suffer.273 
Justice Fukuda also wrote separately.274 His view was that the corre-
spondence between governments constituted a note verbale, and under 
customary international law, such correspondence may not be disclosed 
absent the consent of the other country.275 Justice Fukuda seems to sug-
gest that if upon examination the government’s objection is unjustified, 
the court should then consider whether the foreign state would object to 
production. The clear import of his logic is that if the foreign state ob-
jects, production should not be ordered. 
It is not certain whether there is a majority that would support Justice 
Takii’s rationale. Only two Justices have signed on to the Court’s opin-
ion and Justice Fukuda’s view was not discussed in the other opinions. 
Nor does Justice Fukuda address whether he approves or disapproves of 
the approach taken by Justices Takaii and Imai. What does seem clear is 
that, while the Court had some question about the presentations by the 
Ministries, it was unwilling to allow production simply because the Min-
istries had not supported their opinions with concrete reasons—and the 
Court was not prepared to allow the High Court to determine the matter 
                                                                                                             
 268. Case No. 4 (Gyo-Fu) of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 22, 2005), 
 translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.22-
2005.-Gyo-Fu-.No..4.html. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. (Takii, J. and Imai, J., concurring). 
 272. Id. 
 273. Case No. 4 (Gyo-Fu) of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 22, 2005),  
translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07.22-
2005.-Gyo-Fu-.No..4.html. 
 274. Id. (Fukuda, J., concurring). 
 275. Id. 
168 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:1 
without a searching investigation into the Ministries’ rationale, including 
an in camera review of the documents. Moreover, at least two Justices 
sitting in the Second Petty Bench were prepared to place a substantial 
burden on the government when it objects to production of documents 
that may be relevant in a civil litigation involving the government. How-
ever, the case did not examine whether a more stringent standard would 
apply when government documents are sought for use in a private law-
suit in which the government is not a party. 
In October 2005, the Third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court had an 
opportunity to discuss this issue in a case dealing with an industrial acci-
dent in which a child worker was injured.276 The Labor Ministry con-
ducted an investigation of the accident pursuant to its statutory author-
ity.277 The Ministry prepared an investigative report that contained gov-
ernment investigators’ opinions on the future steps required to prevent 
such accidents, and a factual statement of the investigators’ analysis as to 
what had occurred.278 This analysis was based, in large part, on inter-
views with management and other company personnel.279 In a suit by the 
injured child’s family against the company, the family sought disclosure 
of the report.280 The Labor Office objected to production, claiming that 
the report contained official secrets and that disclosure would discourage 
cooperation in future investigations, damaging the government’s ability 
to serve the public interest.281 The report disclosed the names of persons 
contacted by the office and summarized interviews, but it did not quote 
individual statements.282 The various workers contacted during the inves-
tigation also objected to production of the report.283 The High Court in 
Nagoya refused to order production. The Supreme Court reversed in part 
and affirmed in part.284 
The Supreme Court noted that the report contained two types of infor-
mation.285 First, there was information that disclosed opinions of gov-
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ernment workers as to what future action should be taken.286 This infor-
mation disclosed the government’s investigative techniques, which the 
Court concluded were state secrets and the disclosure of which was un-
warranted (“Category I materials”).287 The other type of information con-
tained in the report was material based on interviews, reports, and meas-
urements, which the Court concluded, as an initial matter, were the se-
crets of the employer, not the government.288 The employer’s secret ma-
terial wound up in the government’s hands as a consequence of the in-
vestigation, was of a factual nature, and was not linked to any specific 
interviewee.289 The Court ordered production of this material (“Category 
II materials”).290 
The interaction between the Court’s holdings regarding the two catego-
ries of material is instructive. As an initial matter, the Court concluded 
that all of the material being sought constituted government secrets.291 
Private secret information retains its secret character and becomes a gov-
ernment secret when it comes into the government’s hands as a conse-
quence of the government’s investigation and could damage the govern-
ment’s ability to perform its public interest functions if disclosed.292 
Thus, both categories of information may be denied production if there is 
likelihood that production will damage the ability of the government to 
carry out its functions in the public interest.293 The Court then turned to 
the government’s reasons for objecting to production. It first established 
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the appropriate standard for evaluating the government’s reasons for 
nondisclosure. Here, the Court adopted the same approach as Justices 
Takaii and Imai (although it did not cite them or otherwise refer to the 
July decision), holding that there must be a specific or concrete showing 
that there exists a likelihood that the public interest will be damaged by 
production.294 An abstract possibility that production could hurt the pub-
lic interest is not sufficient to deny production.295 Second, the Court de-
termined that the likelihood of damage to the public interest must be 
based on the content of the documents sought. 
As the documents sought in the instant case contained two different 
categories of information, the Court dealt with each in turn. As to the 
Category I materials, the Court found that production should not be 
made.296 This determination seems to mirror the determination in the Fuji 
Bank line of cases. In both the public and private sector, the Court is 
concerned about keeping decision-making lines of communication open 
and allowing the unedited and unfettered statements of employees. Ac-
cordingly, the Category II material need not be produced.297 As to Cate-
gory I material, the Court recognized the arguments based on privacy 
concerns of workers at the company and the potential inability of the 
government to properly carry out future investigations.298 The Court re-
jected both arguments.299 
The employee privacy argument was rejected as a factual matter since 
the report itself failed to disclose who said what.300 Moreover, the report 
mixed interview materials with other materials and opinions of the inves-
tigators to such an extent that the statements of individual employees or 
directors could not be discerned.301 As a consequence, the Court found 
there was no real loss of privacy at stake.302 Further, production would 
not hinder the ability of the government to perform future investigations 
since the statutory law required employer-employee cooperation with 
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government investigators.303 As the two types of information in the re-
port could be readily segregated, there was no reason not to order pro-
duction of the Category I materials, and the Court did so.304 
In a case involving the Sendai City Assembly,305 it was alleged that 
funds disbursed to various political factions to use in research under the 
Local Autonomy Law306 were improperly allocated.307 As a consequence, 
the plaintiff sought repayment of such sums to the municipal govern-
ment.308 In the course of the litigation, and to prove the validity of the 
claim, the plaintiff sought an order that would require production of the 
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studies.309 The issue before the Court was whether the reports were self-
use documents and thus exempt from production.310 
The Court began its analysis by stating the basic principles for the self-
use exception: (i) a document must be prepared solely for the use of the 
holder or those within its organization and was not intended for disclo-
sure; (ii) disclosure is likely to violate privacy or prevent or inhibit em-
ployees from making unfettered opinions and decisions; (iii) a significant 
or at least not insignificant injury to the holder of the document in the 
event of disclosure; and (iv) no special circumstances exist that would 
warrant production, even if all of the above considerations were met.311 
In applying these principles, the Court recognized the necessity for 
transparency since public monies were being expended, but noted that 
the local ordinance provided that information concerning the studies be 
filed with the prefecture, although not the final report or its substance.312 
The Court then noted the highly political nature of such reports and the 
obvious reasons for not providing copies to either opposition factions in 
the Assembly or to the executive branch of the prefectural govern-
ment.313 Both privacy concerns of persons who may have assisted in the 
compilation of the report and the risk that those opinions may not be ob-
jectively voiced if the report’s contents were published counseled in fa-
vor of holding them self-use documents.314 In addition, it could be ex-
pected that production of the report would cause significant problems for 
the faction preparing it, both with the executive branch and competing 
factions.315 As a result, the Court deemed such reports self-use docu-
ments and exempt from production.316 
Justice Yokoo dissented.317 In his view, research reports are subject to 
review by an outside person who is not a member of the faction under-
taking the study.318 This conclusion follows from an analysis of the legal 
basis for spending public monies for the report and the need to ensure 
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that public funds are properly spent.319 Justice Yokoo reasoned that since 
the study report may be reviewed by an outside person, it fails to meet an 
essential element of a self-use document; namely, that there is no expec-
tation that the document will be disclosed to other than the holder of the 
document or those within its organization.320 The dissent disagreed with 
the majority on this essential issue: whether the laws governing the re-
ports contemplated disclosure to persons other than faction members.321 
However, the dissent did not disagree as to the proper test to determine 
whether a document is a self-use document.322 Thus, the dissent and the 
majority were of the view that if the report met the basic requirements 
listed above, it would be a self-use document.323 The disagreement was 
over whether the preparer of the report contemplated that the report 
would be disclosed to persons other than the preparing faction and its 
members. 
In the most recent self-use document case to be decided by the Su-
preme Court—yet another dispute between a bank and a customer— the 
Court appears to have further relaxed the restraints on production of an 
ongoing bank’s records.324 A bank claimed that it had lent money to a 
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customer.325 The customer stated that he thought he was buying insur-
ance, not taking a loan, and the mistake voided the deal.326 In an effort to 
prove the mistake, the customer sought production of internal documents 
of the bank.327 The documents were communications from the bank’s 
head office to its branches detailing the bank’s policy of selling variable 
insurance together with loans.328 
The bank argued that the documents were prepared solely for the use 
of the holder (i.e., the bank) and hence fell within the self-use exception 
to production.329 The Court acknowledged that the documents had been 
prepared solely for the internal use of the bank and its employees.330 But, 
because the documents were informational and not prepared in the course 
of decision making, the Court concluded that production would not ad-
versely affect the bank’s ability to make decisions in the future.331 In 
other words, unlike Fuji Bank, where the Court found the documents 
were part of the decision-making process and production would hamper 
future decision-making by impairing the free flow of information and 
opinions, these documents merely reported bank policy.332 Consequently, 
the Court found that a key element in the self-use document analysis was 
missing—namely, that production would impose any disadvantage to the 
future operations of the bank.333 The documents were ordered pro-
duced.334 
III. CONTEXT, CUSTOM AND COMMUNITY—SUPPORT FOR AND SUP-
PORTED BY THE DECISIONS 
A. Introduction 
The Fuji Bank decision placed a severe limitation on the production of 
documents in a holder’s possession by broadly interpreting the new statu-
tory self-use exception. Yet the decision did not completely exempt self-
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use documents from production under the 1996 Code. Rather, the Court 
focused on two characteristics in order to assess whether a self-use 
document could be considered exempt from production: (i) the docu-
ment’s production would work some significant hardship to the posses-
sor of the document, or (ii) there were special circumstances warranting 
production notwithstanding its status as a self-use document. Fuji Bank 
was viewed by both bengoshi and lower court judges as a severe restric-
tion on document production.335 However, subsequent decisions have 
significantly modified Fuji Bank, allowing parties greater access to 
documents while simultaneously developing a doctrine that supports 
Japanese customs and community values. 
Japan is a collective, or group, society, whereas the United States is an 
individualist society.336 American society places a high value on individ-
ual rights, and it is believed that society in general—as an aggregation of 
individuals—will ultimately benefit from the protection of individual 
rights. Still, the concept of rights in the United States is an individual 
one. In contrast, in Japan the group or collective is significantly more 
important than the individual. 
Collective societies tend to be “high context” societies, which means 
that interactions may only be understood by taking into account the en-
tire context of the communication, including the parties to the communi-
cation, body language, and the customs that are prevalent in the soci-
ety.337 In collective societies, “group goals have precedence over indi-
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viduals’ goals”338 and “the group is the center of decision-making.”339 
Not only is Japan a group society, but is also a society in which hierarchy 
and status matter significantly.340 
The concepts of hierarchy and status were first solidified and stratified 
in the late fifteenth century by the unifier and civil ruler of Japan, Hideo-
shi, and then hermetically sealed in the sixteenth and later centuries by 
the Tokugawa Shoguns.341 “[S]tatus and group lines created the vertical 
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gawa was successful and, in the early seventeenth century, was named Shogun by the 
Emperor. See John Whitney Hall, The Bakuhan System, in 4 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
JAPAN 128, 141–147 (John Whitney Hall ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991). Succeeding 
members of the Tokugawa family were named Shogun by later Emperors and the Toku-
gawa family controlled a unified Japan for the next 250 years—a period known as the 
Tokugawa Shogunate. The Shogunate came to an end with the Meiji Restoration. See 
Marius B. Jansen, The Meiji Restoration, in 5 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN 308, 
353–359 (Marius B. Jansen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989). The Tokugawa Shogunate 
was a period of high feudalism in Japan characterized by a strict class system headed by 
2007] CONTEXT, CULTURE, COMMUNITY 177 
and horizontal boundaries which defined and confined the individual 
within his society.”342 Further, status was the defining characteristic of 
law during the feudal period.343 During Japan’s feudal period most of the 
population lived in villages that were semiautonomous and where the 
self-policing, five-household group organization created joint responsi-
bility.344 But hierarchy and status were a critical element of life, whether 
one was in the elite samurai (warrior) class or the peasant farming 
class.345 Belonging to your appropriate group in society was an essential 
element of life. 
Chief among the status-binding institutions was the family system (the 
ie). The ie was a household system wherein authority over the family 
resided in the head of the house, who controlled the property of the house 
and had significant decision-making authority over house members.346 
Members of society belonged first to their house; second to their com-
munity (such as their village, their block in town, or their military or-
ganization, etc.); and third, to neighborhood groups within their commu-
                                                                                                             
the Samurai class. See Wakita Osamu, The Social and Economic Consequences of Unifi-
cation, in 4 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN 96, 121–125 (John Whitney Hall ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991); Kenneth B. Pyle, Meiji Conservatism, in 5 THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN 674, 708–713 (Marius B. Jansen ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1989). 
 342. John W. Hall, Rule by Status in Tokugawa Japan, 1 J. JAPAN. STUD. 39, 45 
(1974). 
 343. Yoshirō Hiramatsu, Tokugawa Law, 14 LAW IN JAPAN 1, 40–41 (Dan F. Hender-
son trans.). Yoshirō Hiramatsu explains:  
In Tokugawa times, status discipline and legal discipline had inseparable struc-
tures. . . . Status discipline regulated the people . . . . It showed the superior-
inferior relationships within the groups. . . . Ethics and humanity were usually 
advocated for each social status based on superior-inferior relations transcend-
ing all . . . . In daily life, status norms were regarded as the primary obligation, 
and the penal law protected them. 
Id. 
 344. See Macfarlane, supra note 19, at 369; HAMILTON & SANDERS, supra note 39, at 
32. 
 345. HERMAN OOMS, TOKUGAWA VILLAGE PRACTICE: CLASS, STATUS, POWER, LAW 
338 (1996) (“Hierarchy seems to be present in all societies at all levels as the result of an 
informing ideological principle . . . .”); id. at 168 (“Hierarchical lineage structure seems 
to have determined all important relationships within the village.”). 
 346. See GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 25, at 90–92. See also William 
Burke, Creative Response and Adaptive Response in Japanese Society, 21 AM. J. ECON. 
& SOC. 103 (1962). 
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nity (such as the five-household groups).347 In this setting, collective de-
cision-making and codependence became ingrained in society and a cul-
ture based on “mutual, interdependent relations and reliance” devel-
oped.348 Given this culture and its emphasis on hierarchy and status, it is 
but a short step to realize that “legal relations” flowed from group and 
status structure.349 
The efforts of the judicial branch to create a legal doctrine favoring the 
lower-status class in its conflict with the upper classes evidence the per-
sistence of hierarchical and status elements that characterized Tokugawa 
Japan in modern Japanese society. Thus, tenants are favored over land-
lords, employees over employers, franchisees over franchisors and dis-
tributors over manufacturers, leveling the status divide between them.350 
Modern legislation integrates this theme by providing consumers with 
protections against business.351 
Notwithstanding the post-war Americanized constitution that empha-
sizes individual rights, Japan remains a communal society that recog-
nizes hierarchy and class status. Judges, as part of the community, apply 
the common sense of the community in rendering judicial decisions that 
uphold community values.352 A compelling example of the judiciary’s 
need to apply community values and the common sense of the society is 
                                                                                                             
 347. See OOMS, supra note 345, at 80 (“The five-household groups were adopted na-
tionwide in the mid 1630s in order to establish multipurpose subvillage administrative 
units . . . .”). 
 348. Kinko Ito, Nihon Shakatowa Nanika: Fukuzatsukeimo Shitenkara [What is Japa-
nese Society?—From the Perspective of the Complex System], 5 JAP. STUD. REV. 108, 110 
(2001) (book review). 
 349. In Tokugawa Japan, households, rather than individuals, were the subject of regu-
lations and parties to disputes. OOMS, supra note 345, at 5. See also Richard B. Parker, 
Law, Language and the Individual in Japan and the United States, 7 WIS. INT’L L.J. 179, 
200 (1988) (“If it is true that Japan is a society of ‘contextuals’ rather than ‘individuals’ 
and that the use of language in Japan is highly contextual, then we should expect that law 
in Japan to also be ‘contextual.’ It is.”). 
 350. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 351. See, e.g., Consumer Contract Law, Law No. 61 of 2000, art. 3, 4, 8, translation 
available at http://www.asianlii.org/jp/legis/laws/cca2000an61o2000274/ (giving con-
sumers the right to withdraw consent to a contract in various situations, requiring con-
sumer contracts to be written in “clear and plain terms,” and voiding various contract 
provisions that place business in a preferred position over consumers); Arbitration Law, 
Law No. 138 of 2003, Supp. Prov., art.3, translation available at The Arbitration Law 
Follow-up Research Group, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/arbitration 
law.pdf (Mar. 2004). 
 352. See, e.g., Hiroshi Itoh, How Judges Think in Japan, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 775 
(1970). 
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found in the Gokoku Enshrinement case.353 In this case, the Christian 
wife of a deceased Self-Defense Force member contested the enshrine-
ment of her husband at a Shinto Shrine dedicated to members of the mili-
tary establishment.354 The plaintiff based her claim on the Japanese Con-
stitution’s protection of the freedom of religion—in this case her religion 
was Christianity, while the religious affiliation of the Shrine was 
Shinto.355 Her husband apparently had no religious affiliation.356 The 
Court concluded that the enshrinement was a “private law matter” be-
tween the wife and the Shrine.357 As such, it did not implicate govern-
ment action.358 Thus, the constitution was not directly applicable to the 
Shrine’s actions.359 
The Court then turned to the issue of whether, as a private law matter, 
the enshrinement was a violation of article 90 of the Civil Code that 
voids juridical acts that are contrary to good faith.360 The Court found 
that the enshrinement did not violate any of the wife’s legal rights, so 
there was no violation of the Civil Code.361 The concurring opinion of 
Justice Nagashima is instructional. Justice Nagashima pointed out that 
although the wife was Christian, the other surviving relatives of the de-
ceased were Buddhist or Shinto.362 In his view, there was no reason to 
prioritize the wife’s religious beliefs over the beliefs of the other family 
members.363 Similarly, Justice Sakaue was concerned about the effect of 
                                                                                                             
 353. See Case No. 902 of 1982, 42 MINSHŪ 277 (Sup. Ct., June 1, 1988), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1988.06.01-1982-O-No. 902. 
html. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Case No. 902 of 1982, 42 MINSHŪ 277 (Sup. Ct., June 1, 1988), translation avail-
able at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1988.06.01-1982-O-No. 902.html. 
 359. Id. The government, in the form of the Self-Defense Force, did play a role in the 
enshrinement when it provided data and administrative assistance to the shrine. The gov-
ernment also supported the enshrinement by having an officer attend meetings concern-
ing enshrinement and by cooperating with the Veterans Association, which was instru-
mental in securing enshrinement at this particular site. Id. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Case No. 902 of 1982, 42 MINSHŪ 277 (Sup. Ct., June 1, 1988), translation avail-
able at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1988.06.01-1982-O-No. 902.html. 
 363. Id. (Nagashima, J., concurring). Justice Nagaishima remarked:  
There is no legal grounds for giving priority to a surviving spouse over surviv-
ing parents or children with regard to mourning and honoring the memory of 
the deceased, and it is obvious that things would be out of control if relatives 
who believe in different religions may seek legal remedies against each other 
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the wife’s actions on the other family members. He would have gone 
further than the Court or Justice Nagashima, and would have recognized 
the need for the individual to subordinate her personal “right” to the 
“rights” of others in the community.364 Professor Haley, in reference to 
this case, has said: 
The Yamaguchi Shrine case, along with the landmark 1977, 1983, and 
1997 Supreme Court decisions, together reflect judicial deference to 
community values. . . . Stripped of legal garb . . . the case involves a 
challenge to community practice and an established pattern of life. The 
plaintiff petitioned for the state to intervene to protect her individual in-
terest and beliefs against the actions taken by and on behalf of the com-
munity of which she was a part. The judicial response was refusal. Act-
ing through the courts, the state denied her the protection she sought. 
This I submit, is the crux of the case and much of Japanese law.365 
More recently, the Supreme Court used community values to inform 
legal relations between parties.366 This decision recognized a common 
                                                                                                             
because of the discomfort for the other relative’s religious action of mourning 
and honoring the memory of the deceased. Thus religious tolerance is necessary 
even with relatives among each other.  
Id. 
 364. Id. (Sakaue, J., concurring). As Justice Sakaue explained:  
It would considerably contradict our common sense or socially accepted idea if 
anyone is free to worship or to pray for the deceased with a religious ceremony 
which is against the will of his or her surviving relatives such as his spouse, de-
scendant or parents and if those relatives are not allowed to oppose and has to 
tolerate such activity of others as long as it is related to religion no matter how 
their mental peace are disturbed. . . . This is the very case where conflict of per-
sonal rights of surviving relatives occurred, in which case the tolerance that the 
majority opinion mentioned is required. Therefore, even if the religious cere-
mony of praying or mourning by other close relatives or those conducted ac-
cording to their will is against one’s will, he or she should be tolerant of it and, 
unless there is such special circumstances as to give priority to his or her men-
tal peace, the infringement of his or her personal rights should not be consid-
ered unlawful since it is within the limitation to be endured. 
Id. 
 365. HALEY, SPIRIT, supra note 55, at 196. However, the constitution did attempt to 
make that transition. Id. at 199. For example, the constitution provides that “[a]ll of the 
people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic 
or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.” KENPŌ, art. 
14, para. 1. 
 366. See Case No. 354 of 2005, 61 MINSHŪ NO. 2 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 8, 2007), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2007.03.08-2005.-Gyo-Hi-
.No..354.html. 
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law spouse’s rights against the national pension system upon the death of 
her husband, even though the spouses were related (uncle and niece) and 
thus could not enter into a lawful marriage under Japan’s Civil Code.367 
The Supreme Court recognized that there were strong social policy rea-
sons for prohibiting the marriage of such close relatives and further rec-
ognized that such marriages were, as a general rule “significantly unethi-
cal or prejudicial to the public interest.”368 Nonetheless the Court noted 
that:  
[A]ccording to the facts mentioned above, in the appellant’s commu-
nity, due to such regional characteristic, marriage between relatives 
took place somewhat frequently . . . . [I]t was acknowledged without 
resistance among their relatives and also publicly accepted in their 
community . . . .369 
Although the American Occupation did not replace the traditional 
Japanese cultural values of community with American values of indi-
vidualism,370 it did have a significant effect on Japanese life, including 
the replacement of the traditional ie with a more nuclear family.371 The 
                                                                                                             
 367. Id. Given this community acceptance of the common law marriage, the fact that 
the uncle and niece lived together as husband and wife for forty-two years and had two 
children born of the common law marriage, the Court found that the “spouse” was enti-
tled to recognition by the national pension system. Given that one principal reason to 
prohibit marriage between an uncle and niece is to avoid circumstances where they might 
have children, forty-two years of cohabitation and the birth of two children might just as 
easily be cited as reasons for denying benefits. Here, the community acceptance of the 
practice outweighed the Civil Code’s prohibition, at least where surviving spouse benefits 
under the national pension system was concerned. See id. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. 
 370. See Lockhart, supra note 340, at 61–62. Lockhart’s observations in this regard are 
particularly apt:  
American postwar occupation, with its imposition of liberal democratic institu-
tions, mitigated many aspects of the starkly differentiating hierarchical prac-
tices of the prewar period. . . . Yet some aspects of social practice routinely de-
viate sharply from these formal standards. . . . [T]he thoroughly hierarchical la-
bor market is riddled with preferences based on family background and age. As 
a result, formally equal Japanese citizens . . . routinely relate to one another, not 
as relative equals, but as social superiors and subordinates. 
Id. 
 371. The American-drafted Japanese Constitution is quite explicit in rejecting the old 
family system: 
Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be 
maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and 
wife as a basis. . . . With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, inheri-
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growth of the economy after the war also had the effect of loosening 
group ties that centered on the “home village.” 
B. Principles Governing Document Production by Corporations and the 
Government 
The Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence concerning production of 
documents can only be fully understood by taking into account Japan’s 
group orientation, its hierarchy and the importance of status, its high-
context communication style, and the significant role of the employing 
corporation in modern Japanese society. Understanding the function of 
document production as merely a means to present evidence in a civil 
litigation is insufficient to appreciate the Supreme Court’s language and 
the thrust of its decisions. Social and cultural factors influence several 
aspects of the Court’s decisions, including: (i) the limitation of the self-
use exception to documents whose production will work a disadvantage 
to the holder of the document; (ii) the emphasis on privacy; and (iii) the 
significance of the decision-making document in the group-oriented cul-
ture of the Japanese corporation. For example, the Supreme Court’s crea-
tion of the significant disadvantage requirement as a necessary condition 
for application of the self-use doctrine in the Fuji Bank case echoes the 
Court’s acceptance of interference with privacy as a significant hardship 
that may be sufficient to avoid production. Neither disadvantage nor pri-
vacy is found in the statute, and privacy is nowhere explained in the Fuji 
Bank decision.372 
While the concept of disadvantage is not found in the language of arti-
cle 220 of the 1996 Code, the statute does exempt from production 
documents that contain information that is covered by a privilege set out 
in article 197, paragraph 1.373 Under this privilege, technical or profes-
                                                                                                             
tance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and 
the family, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and 
the essential equality of the sexes. 
See KENPŌ, art. 24. See generally Kurt Steiner, The Revision of the Civil Code of Japan: 
Provisions Affecting the Family, 9 FAR E.Q. 169 (1950). 
 372. The concept of disadvantage is also not included in the Ministry of Justice’s man-
ual explaining the application of the self-use doctrine. See Mochizuki, supra note 12, at 
302. The Justice Department Manual is quoted to the effect that the old rule of self-use 
documents is incorporated into the statutory language. Under the old rule, there was no 
need for, and no judicial opinions dealing with, an exception based on disadvantage. 
 373. Under the 1996 Code, the provisions dealing with witness testimony precede 
those dealing with documents. Article 197, which is contained in the witness portion of 
the Code, deals with witness privileges. Pursuant to article 197, paragraph 1, government 
officials may refuse to testify about official secrets unless the supervising government has 
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sional secrets contained in documents need not be disclosed. As noted in 
one of the cases discussed above, the holder argued that the electronic 
schematic of its telephone equipment was a technical or professional se-
cret that should not be subject to production.374 The Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the High Court to determine whether the schematic 
qualified as a technical secret, stating: 
The term “technical or professional secret” as provided by Art. 197, 
para. 1, subpara. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be understood 
as matters, which, if made public, their social value of which would de-
cline and the activities using these will be difficult, or will seriously af-
fect the profession and make it difficult to continue the profession.375 
Thus, under one subpart of article 220 of the Code, there is explicit ref-
erence (by way of incorporation) to the concept of disadvantage as it re-
lates to the issue of document production. It is possible that the Court, 
reading the self-use document provision in the context of article 220, was 
persuaded that the concept of disadvantage also permeated the self-use 
exception.376 
Among the various forms of significant disadvantage that could meet 
the self-use exception, the Court specifically mentions both privacy and 
limits on the decision-making process of individuals and organiza-
tions.377 These are not the only possible categories of disadvantage; they 
are merely illustrations of disadvantage to the holder of a document that 
                                                                                                             
granted permission for such testimony. See MINSOHŌ, art. 197, para. 1 (referencing article 
191, which governs examination of a government official regarding official secrets). 
Article 197, paragraph 2 incorporates the more familiar evidentiary privileges such as 
attorney-client and physician-patient. See id. art. 197, para. 2. Article 197, paragraph 3 
permits a witness to refuse to testify if the testimony would disclose technical or profes-
sional secrets. See id. art. 197, para. 3. 
 374. See supra notes 136–54 and accompanying text. 
 375. See Case No. 20 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 1073 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 10, 2000), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.3.10-1999.-Kyo-.No. 
20.html. 
 376. At first glance, traditional privileges do not appear to involve a determination of 
disadvantage. After all, a patient need not make a showing of disadvantage to prevent 
testimony concerning his medical records. However, the traditional privileges are all 
founded on disadvantage or privacy concerns. For instance, the doctor-patient privilege 
deals with personal private materials, while the attorney-client privilege implicates both 
private matters and disadvantage. Just as the Supreme Court has bundled the concept of 
privacy into disadvantage, it has bundled article 197, paragraph 2 into the disadvantage 
definition. 
 377. Although the Court has grounded its determination that there was a significant 
disadvantage solely on the latter. See Case No. 20 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 1073 (Sup. Ct., 
Mar. 10, 2000), translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/ 
text/2000.3.10-1999.-Kyo-.No.20.html. 
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call for denial of production. Precisely whose privacy the Court appears 
prepared to protect is not stated. There are several possibilities—the pri-
vacy of the corporate entity, the privacy of the author(s) of the document, 
or the privacy of corporate employees who provided information incor-
porated in the document. 
The fact that the Court did not specifically define whose privacy was 
involved may trouble an American observer, but this is merely a reflec-
tion of the difference in cultural communication between the United 
States and Japan. What Americans may view as a failure to expressly 
state something in a conversation or court decision may simply be a re-
flection of cultural differences. Japan is a high context society wherein 
contextual factors affect the meaning of words, rules, actions, etc., 
whereas the United States is a low context society.378 In a low context 
society, it is expected that communications will be more precise and spe-
cific than would be expected in a high context society.379 In contrast, 
vagueness in communication is a key characteristic of a high context so-
ciety.380 Indeed, vagueness may be a means of permitting later reconsid-
                                                                                                             
 378. See generally EDWARD T. HALL, BEYOND CULTURE (1976); EDWARD T. HALL & 
MILDRED REED HALL, HIDDEN DIFFERENCES: DOING BUSINESS WITH THE JAPANESE 
(1987); TAKIE SUGIYAMA LEBRA, JAPANESE PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR 46–48 (Univ. Press 
Hawaii 1977). See also Martin Rösch & Kay G. Segler, Communication with Japanese, 
27 MGMT. INT’L REV. 56, 60 (1987) (“In countries such as Japan with a highly contexted 
mode of communication a message will generally carry a smaller part of explicitly stated 
information; i.e., the context carries more information than it would in countries with a 
low level of context information . . . .”); Kristiina Jokinen & Graham Wilcock, Contex-
tual Inferences in Intercultural Communication, 19 SKY J. LINGUISTICS 291, 291–92 
(2006) (“In the low context culture, everything is fully spelled out . . . . In a high context 
culture . . . communicators assume a lot of shared knowledge, experience, and world 
view . . . less is made explicit and much more is implicit . . . .”). 
 379. See Judy Minot, On Common Sense, www.kokikai.org/. Judy Minot elaborates on 
this distinction as follows: 
In high context cultures a lot of communication takes place through “things not 
said.” In low context cultures people mean what they say (or at least they think 
they do) in any case people place highest value on explicit communication 
through words. If someone doesn’t understand something in a low context, they 
ask questions. In a high context culture they would find out the answer by look-
ing around them, seeing how people interact, understanding from the context.  
Id. 
 380. Hiroshi Hasegawa, Japanese Linguistic Ambiguity, INT’L J. LANGUAGE SOC’Y & 
CULTURE (2000), http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/Journal/ARTICLES/Hasegawa/ 
Hasegawa2.html. Hiroshi Hasegawa discusses this in detail: 
High context is the situation in which human interaction can be exercised ex-
changing less information such as knowledge, concept and experience between 
individuals. . . . This implies that more and accurate information is required 
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eration of the question as a consensus begins to form on a meaning.381 
Thus, to understand what the Court meant by its reference to privacy as a 
significant hardship factor, one must look to its context. 
Just as the initial draftsman of Japan’s civil law system had to invent 
Japanese words in an attempt to capture concepts of Western law that did 
not exist and could not be written or said in Japanese, so too do modern 
Japanese freely borrow words from another language.382 But the concept 
behind the word may be quite different in Japanese.383 Indeed, “the as-
sumption that the same words [in the different languages of English and 
Japanese] have the same meaning may well be misleading.”384 
It seems obvious that disclosure documents prepared for a decision-
making process containing views of the bank employees would implicate 
their individual privacy concerns. How, then, can it be explained that the 
Supreme Court allowed the views of the employees to be disclosed 
through production of the bank’s records once the bank no longer issued 
loans?385 While the Court was concerned with the privacy rights of em-
ployees of the ongoing Fuji Bank, it was apparently unconcerned about 
the privacy rights of the employees of the bank that had failed and was in 
                                                                                                             
with precise words/phrases/topic selection in undeviating speech pattern in or-
der to minimize the communication failure. . . . In the consideration of the in-
teracting procedure created by most Japanese people, they are categorized as 
the high context personalities. 
Id. 
 381. See Joan C. Howden, Competitive and Collaborative Style: American Men and 
Women, American Men and Japanese Men, IV:1 INTERCULTURAL COMM. STUD. 49, 54 
(1994) (“Deliberate vagueness is employed in Japanese language not to show weakness 
and subordination, but to leave room for arrangements and planning to be conducted or 
negotiated among many members of a collectivist group, or a network of those con-
cerned.”). 
 382. See Kenneth K. Port, The Japanese International Law “Revolution”: Interna-
tional Human Rights Law and Its Impact in Japan, 28 STAN. J. INT’L L. 139, 166–67 
(1991) (discussing how the Japanese do not share the Western concept of “rights”). 
 383. For example, a Japanese “mansion” is generally a small apartment in a concrete 
building with a door person, not a “mansion” as visualized in the United States. A Japa-
nese “mansion” is an apartment that is distinguished from a Japanese “apartment” by the 
nature of the building in which it is located. 
 384. Rösch & Segler, supra note 378, at 62. In Japanese, a word may even have differ-
ent meanings based on its context. “Even in the Japanese language, context to a large 
extent determines the significance of a word. Japanese allows a fairly substantial range of 
interpretations; the actually intended meaning of a word will only be clear when all its 
circumstances are taken into account.” Id. at 61. 
 385. See Case. No. 15 of 2001, 55 MINSHŪ 1411 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 7, 2001),  
translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2001.12.07-2001-
Kyo-No.15.html and supra notes 179–92 and accompanying text. 
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liquidation. To American eyes, the employees’ privacy interests would 
appear to be the same in both instances, rendering the decisions inconsis-
tent. The answer may reside in the different meaning given to the con-
cept of privacy rights in Japan. Privacy, when used in the context of a 
corporate employee’s relationship with her employer, may not carry the 
individual or personal connotation that it has in American law. In the 
analysis of the Supreme Court of Japan, privacy is seen in a group con-
text rather than in a personal context. 
The interpretation of employee privacy in the context of the document 
production decisions may have additional roots in the varying nature of 
the concept of rights as understood in Japan. Rights may be individual in 
some contexts (such as when a female employee sues because she has 
been sexually harassed by her employer), but group-oriented in others 
(such as when the government passes special laws to better the economic 
conditions of the so-called Burakumin, but fails to pass laws that prohibit 
discrimination against them—even though they are Japanese citi-
zens386—or fails to pass laws that protect the indigenous people of Japan, 
who are also Japanese citizens). In addition, rights may also be under-
stood as relating to the contextual relationship in which the right is in-
                                                                                                             
 386. See Leslie D. Alldritt, The Burakumin: The Complicity of Japanese Buddhism in 
Oppression and an Opportunity for Liberation, J. OF BUDDHIST ETHICS 7 (2000), 
http://www.buddhistethics.org/7/alldritt001.html. Leslie Alldritt describes the plight of 
the Burakumin as follows:  
Through sustained political activism, the burakumin have caused legislation to 
be passed since the war that has dramatically bettered conditions for them-
selves. These improvements have come primarily in such issues as better hous-
ing and education. . . . [T]he burakumin . . . continue to suffer from, in com-
parison to the majority Japanese, higher illness rates, higher unemployment, 
lower wages for the same jobs, illegal lists that corporations buy and use to 
avoid hiring buraku people, discrimination in marriage, and myriad abusive and 
discriminatory attacks on their person and position.  
Id. Frank Upham criticizes the current Burakumin policy as follows:  
If . . . the goal of dowa policy is the full acceptance of Burakumin by the major-
ity, the present mode of affirmative action seems, at least in the short run, 
anomalous if not deliberately destructive of the goal. It stresses precisely the 
programs which will intensify Buraku isolation and ignores those that would 
bring them into the mainstream. It is as if the present intent was to improve 
their lot as a group in a narrow economic sense while ignoring the facilitation 
of individual entry into majority life. 
Frank K. Upham, Ten Years of Affirmative Action for Japanese Burakumin: A Prelimi-
nary Report on the Law on Special Measures for Dowa Projects, 13 LAW IN JAPAN 39, 69 
(1980). See also UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY IN POST WAR JAPAN, supra note 64, at 
78–124. 
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voked. In the case of corporate documents, the right may be one that ex-
ists in relation to the employees’ relationship with their employer. 
Because individual identity in Japan is grounded on group member-
ship,387 where “the primary principle is to safeguard the harmony of the 
group, and the main challenge for the individual is to find their place 
within a wider fellowship,” 388 it is easy to comprehend a system where 
the privacy interest is understood in group terms, i.e., what is at stake is 
not the right of individual employees to privacy, but the right to privacy 
of the company collectively. 
An individual’s identity in Japan is grounded on the individual’s group 
identity: 
The strong sense of belongingness as a stake for self-identity, rein-
forced by collectivism and conformism, calls for the individual’s total 
commitment and loyalty to his group. . . . These mutual obligations of 
loyalty and total protection are an established practice in the Japanese 
employment system, particularly in large corporations. . . . In such a 
system, the employee not only is obligated to stay on in the same com-
pany. . . but he cannot afford to move. Chances are that he will not be 
offered a job from the outside. . . . All this reflects the tendency of the 
Japanese employee to find his identity in belongingness rather than in 
the cultivation and exhibition of professional expertise. . . . Employ-
ment seems to mean, above all, the teaching and learning of the em-
ployee’s role in relation to the employer and other senior employees, 
with emphasis upon loyalty and group identification.389 
This is particularly so when hierarchy and status within the group are 
as significant as they are in Japanese culture. 
Similar themes emerge in Japanese human rights theory. Professor 
Ishida, who has traced its development, noted that after the restoration, 
but prior to the promulgation of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan 
(Meiji Constitution), a “collectivity-realism” theory of law developed to 
deal with questions of human rights: “The collective realism theory ne-
glected the idea that a group is organized of individuals and, moreover, 
                                                                                                             
 387. CAROLYN S. STEVENS, ON THE MARGINS OF JAPANESE SOCIETY 16 (1997) (“In 
Japanese society, group membership is the basis for individual identity . . . .”). See Hiro-
shi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan 
and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC. REV. 461, 465 (1986) (“Traditional Japanese 
norms emphasize harmonious interpersonal relations and group solidarity. . . . Within a 
group, maintenance of harmonious and smooth interpersonal relations, interdependence 
and mutual trust are of utmost importance.”). See generally LEBRA, supra note 378, at 
22–37. 
 388. Dag Leonardsen, The Impossible Case of Japan, 35 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 203, 220 (2002). 
 389. LEBRA, supra note 378, at 31–32. 
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advocated the idea that the group existed as a natural organic body which 
transcends individuals.”390 
Professor Ishida further elaborated: “The group has an existence apart 
from its members. This has similarity with the concept of ‘realism’ in the 
philosophical sense, which is the doctrine that universals have real objec-
tive existence; therefore collectivity realism theory is the translation 
used.”391 Ishida also observed a tendency to overemphasize the collectiv-
ity realism theory in the post-war era.392 In his discussion of the theoreti-
cal work of Yozo Watanabe, he commented: 
[T]he important thing, from the viewpoint of fundamental human 
rights, is the group’s decision-making process. Watanabe assumed the 
group decision as though it had an organic nature. . . . [F]or example: 
The rights and liberty of the group are at the foundation of the 
rights and liberties of the individual. The destruction of the 
freedom of the group is no more than destruction of the free-
dom of the individual. We must, therefore, place a guaranty of 
freedom of group activity at the core of the problem of spiri-
tual freedom in present days.393 
                                                                                                             
 390. Takeshi Ishida, Fundamental Human Rights and the Development of Legal 
Thought in Japan, 8 LAW IN JAPAN 39, 52 (Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Beverly Braverman 
trans., 1975). 
 391. Id. at 52 n.38. 
 392. Id. at 63. 
 393. Id. at 65 (citing Y. WATANABE, KEMPŌ TO GENDAI HŌGAKU 79 (1963)). Parker explains: 
In other words, for the Japanese, one is one’s share in social relationships, not 
metaphorically, but literally. . . . Understanding the Japanese conception of the 
self as contextual helps us to understand . . . the beginning of a general explana-
tion of the nature of the “mutual trust,” “personal interdependency,” and “group 
harmony” which the Japanese value so much. In a society made up of “contex-
tuals” rather than “individuals,” terms such as “trust” and “interdependence” 
and “harmony” do not describe moral goals to be achieved by individuals; they 
are rather part of the definition of what it means to be human and Japanese. 
Parker, supra note 349, at 189. The question of the relationship of the individual to the 
group is discussed at length in Hamaguchi Esyun, A Contextual Model of the Japanese: 
Toward a Methodological Innovation in Japan Studies, 11 J. JAPAN. STUD. 289 (Kumon 
Shumpei & Mildred R. Creighton trans., 1985). Hamaguchi notes: 
It has also been argued that, in contrast to individual actors, the Japanese are 
contextual actors participating in aidagara relationships. It has further been ar-
gued that this type of actorship is consistent with the Japanese social system, a 
system of holonic decentralized control where spontaneous cooperation is es-
sential. Such an evaluation is only a first step. If we can proceed to develop a 
new general systems theory that lays a foundation for methodological contextu-
alism, new horizons for Japan studies will be opened. 
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Thus, it is possible to interpret the privacy interest mentioned by the 
Court as an interest that the employer-employee corporate group has in 
protecting the views and opinions of the employees from public disclo-
sure. The right is a communal right of protection that belongs to the em-
ployer-employee group, not to the individual employees. Once the bond 
of the group is broken (such as by the dissolution of the employer), the 
group right is also broken. Hence, it is consistent to say that a right to 
privacy might be implicated in the continuing business context of the 
Fuji Bank, where the bond of the employer-employee corporate group 
remains intact, but is not implicated in the case of the financial institution 
that was dissolved.394 
Moreover, it has been suggested that in post-modern industrial Japan, 
the corporation has replaced the family and home village as the central 
community for Japanese workers.395 More recently it has been postulated 
that the corporate community is an aspect of Japan’s post-war moderni-
zation, which flows from the unique relationship of the Japanese com-
pany to both its shareholders and employees.396 As a consequence: “Em-
                                                                                                             
Id. at 321. Takie Sugiyama Lebra describes the nature of collectivism: 
The Japanese concern for belonging relates to the tendency towards collectiv-
ism, which is expressed by an individual’s identification with the collective 
goal of the group to which he belongs. Collectivism thus involves cooperation 
and solidarity . . . . What would be strictly a private matter in an individualistic 
society tends to be a group enterprise in Japan. 
LEBRA, supra note 378, at 25. 
 394. See Case. No. 15 of 2001, 55 MINSHŪ 1411 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 7, 2001), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2001.12.07-2001-Kyo-No. 
15.html and supra notes 179–92 and accompanying text. 
 395. See HAMILTON & SANDERS, supra note 39, at 29. Hamilton and Sanders describe 
this transformation:  
The parallel between firm and family must be understood in light of the fact 
that even the traditional family ie was as much a corporate group, an economic 
unit, as it was a bloodline. Membership in an ie was to some extent determined 
by who contributed to the economic welfare of the group. . . . Thus the Japa-
nese household is both a descent group and a corporate group. 
Id. 
 396. See Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, Distributing Responsibility for Wrongdo-
ing Inside Corporate Hierarchies: Public Judgments in Three Societies, 21 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 815, 827 (1996). Sanders and Hamilton describe the corporation-employee rela-
tionship:  
Japanese employment policies reflect the relatively contextual nature of social 
relationships. Lifetime employment for permanent employees in larger firms 
ties workers to employers more closely than in the United States. Practices such 
as tsukiui, the after-hours socializing among white-collar workers, and work-
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ployees of a firm identify themselves so strongly with the corporate 
community that they lose their sense of being members of civil society 
and become completely absorbed in their roles as members of the corpo-
rate community.” 397 Japanese corporations engage in a structured orien-
tation of new employees that aims to socialize the new employee to the 
corporate community. Thereafter, the lifetime employment system, the 
seniority-based pay system, and the after-work socializing hours among 
employees operate to cement the community.398 
It has been suggested that Japanese corporate governance is based on 
the concept of the corporate community: 
The Company Community consists of management, board members, 
and core employees, who share an identity as “company men.” In Ja-
pan, when people say “company,” it means the Company Community. 
The Company Community provides a reason de etre to its members 
and plays a role as a competing unit in the product market. Members of 
the Company Community owe, in their psychological level, the duty of 
loyalty to the Community itself and their fellow members.399 
                                                                                                             
group activities such as quality circles produce an employment relationship  
that is more like family relationships than is typically the case in the United 
States. . . . For many Japanese workers the firm is not simply their place of em-
ployment but a community with which they identify. 
 397. Hirowatari, supra note 42, at 163. The strength of the concept of corporate com-
munity is reflected in questions and comments posed to Professor Millhaupt after his talk 
on Choice as Regulatory Reform: 
Q: . . . The concept of a company community is very strong and so far share-
holders have never intervened. . . . 
. . . 
Q: Parent-subsidiary relationships are not the same as in the U.S. In Japan, even 
100% subsidiaries organize their own communities. For the company commu-
nity members of the subsidiary, the parent company is an outsider for them. . . . 
. . .  
Curtis Millhaupt, Professor, Columbia Law School, Speech at the BBL Seminar, Choice 
as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate Governance (May 12, 2004), 
available at http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/04051201.html. 
 398. See HAMILTON & SANDERS, supra note 39, at 67–70. For the importance of com-
munity in Japanese law, see JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND 
THE JAPANESE PARADOX (1991) and HALEY, SPIRIT, supra note 55, at 134–40, 211; Luke 
Nottage, Translating Tanese: Challenging Paradigms of Japanese Law and Society, 
Seminar Paper Presented at Sho Sato Conference at Boalt Hall School of Law, Berkeley, 
California (Feb. 12–13, 2005). 
 399. Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of the 
Corporate Law and Their Solutions 16 (Berkeley Program in Law & Economics, Work-
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It may be that privacy as used in corporate document production cases 
is not the personal privacy that is common to American lawyers. Rather, 
privacy may be viewed in the context of the corporation-employee group 
relationship.400 In such a case, it is not a personal privacy interest401 of 
the employee that is at stake, but rather a privacy interest of the em-
ployee as it relates to her relationship with the corporation.402 In essence, 
                                                                                                             
ing Paper No. 23, 1999). See also TOYOHIRO KONO & STEWART R. CLEGG, 
TRANSFORMATIONS OF CORPORATE CULTURE: EXPERIENCES OF JAPANESE ENTERPRISES 
373–74 (1998). 
 400. See HAMILTON & SANDERS, supra note 39, at 55. Hamilton and Sanders explain 
the importance of context as follows:  
Japanese talk—and apparently think—about themselves as individuals in con-
text. Thus it is hardly surprising that the philosopher Hajime Nakamura (1968) 
boldly concludes that “Japanese in general did not develop a clear-cut concept 
of the human individual qua individual as an objective unit like an inanimate 
thing, but the individual is always found existing in a network of human rela-
tionships.” 
Id. 
 401. See Burke, supra note 346, at 104–05. This notion of privacy is an aspect of what 
Burke describes as “reciprocal duties and obligations”: 
There is no disputing the fact of the existence of this family-centered group so-
ciety. It is characterized by a “web” of reciprocal duties and obligations that 
permeates all levels of society. In this web society, the individual has no real 
existence outside his group. He lives only as a member of his family or com-
munity . . . .  
Id. (citations omitted). See also Fukui, supra note 27, at 69 (“At least in Japanese society 
. . . the binding of community is considerably solid compared with other modern socie-
ties.”). 
 402. Recent changes in Japan’s labor market may have the effect of eroding to some 
degree the strong corporate community ties that have characterized Japan’s corporate 
world. For example, Kazuo Sugeno explains: 
Such supply-side changes of the labor market are influenced by the changing 
values of workers. In contrast to workers during the growth periods of Japanese 
economy, one finds workers in the recent low-growth years decreasingly iden-
tify themselves with their employer and increasingly desire respect for their 
privacy and family life. This is particularly the case with younger workers. 
These employees also criticize the egalitarian approach in the traditional senior-
ity-based wage and promotion systems as unfair and inefficient. They thus sup-
port differentiation of treatment in accordance with the differences in perform-
ance and contribution. They request to have choices in jobs and career paths. 
Harmonization of working life with workers’ private life is another frequent re-
quest. These phenomena have made the once-solid corporate community in-
creasingly fragmented in its social control. 
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employee-company privacy gives rise to a right on the part of the corpo-
ration (as the representative of the corporate community) not to produce 
the document, but does not give rise to a corresponding right on the part 
of the employee to prevent production of the document. Accordingly, the 
corporate possessor of the document may waive the right and produce. 
This principle would help to explain why only the corporate possessor of 
the document and not the employee has standing to contest a production 
order.403 
And, as Professor Ishida noted, “the important thing, from the view-
point of fundamental human rights, is the group’s decision-making proc-
ess.”404 Similarly, Hall notes the “essential” nature of an open decision-
making process to Japanese business and to the welfare of employees.405 
Accordingly, to protect that decision-making process, it makes sense to 
exempt from discovery documents that explore the process and disclose 
the thoughts of the members of the corporate group participating in the 
decision-making process. 
Related to the need to protect the decision-making process is the need 
to achieve consensus, i.e., harmony within the decision-making group, in 
                                                                                                             
Kazuo Sugeno, The Birth of the Labor Tribunal System in Japan: A Synthesis of Labor 
Law Reform and Judicial Reform, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 519, 523–24 (2004). 
 403. If the modern corporation-employee relationship is seen as a surrogate for the 
feudal relationship, the employee’s privacy interest in matters relating to the corporation 
is more easily understood as creating a right in the corporation that the employing corpo-
ration may rely on or waive, and not as an interest that can exist outside the corporation-
employee relationship. For a discussion of the corporate community and the company-
centered society, see Hirowatari, supra note 42, at 162–64. 
 404. Ishida, supra note 390, at 65. 
 405. HALL & HALL, supra note 378, at 82–83. Hall and Hall describe the collective 
decision-making process in the corporate context as follows: 
This process of collective decision-making allows everyone involved a chance 
to review, evaluate, discuss, and approve or disapprove the proposal. This 
process is absolutely essential. . . . Final decisions entail many, many meetings, 
where all points of view are presented and discussed until consensus is 
achieved. At every stage differences are reconciled. . . . It’s also important to 
remember that in a system of lifetime employment in one of the major firms, 
decisions that affect the future of the company have great personal impact on 
each employee; he knows he will have to live with the results of these deci-
sions. 
Id. Hall and Hall also compare the closed-door, separate office of an American executive 
with the bull-pen style offices of Japanese companies where the senior executives are 
immediately available to others in the organization. Id. at 10 (“[N]ot only are other peo-
ple constantly coming and going, both seeking and giving information, but the entire 
form and function of the organization is centered on gathering, processing, and dissemi-
nating information.”). 
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Japan.406 Achieving harmony may require that individuals compromise 
their personal views to maintain a harmonious relationship with other 
group members. Production of decision-making documents can adversely 
affect the consensus-forming process, and has the added disadvantage of 
disclosing that harmony might not in fact exist.407 
Once the corporation is in the process of liquidation, the decision-
making process of that corporate group is no longer sacrosanct—the 
group bond has been broken. Accordingly, that group’s decision-making 
document may be subject to discovery. Likewise, as protection of the 
group process is the object of the exercise, once a decision has been 
reached, the decision itself is not protected from disclosure. Hence, the 
Supreme Court may allow production of the corporate document sent to 
branch offices that recites the policy and determination of the firm, but 
also protect the decision-making documents that led to that policy.408 It is 
not the opinion of the individual employee that the employer seeks to 
keep private. Rather, it is the opinion rendered to the ongoing entity or 
group that must be protected. Once the group is disbanded, the employee 
has no legitimate reason to have his opinions remain private.409 
It is relevant to note that in the 2005 decision ordering production of 
the factual material in a government labor investigation case, the em-
ployees of the company who had been interviewed by the investigators 
                                                                                                             
 406. See KONO & CLEGG, supra note 399, at 3 (“Within Japanese organizations it is the 
extent and the substance of shared values that determine the members’ decision-making 
patterns. . . . It is these patterns that we argue are at the core of corporate culture.”). Kono 
and Clegg also emphasize the importance of shared information to the Japanese decision-
making process and the importance of consensus and group decision-making. Id. at 374–
75, 380–81. See also ROBERT C. CHRISTOPHER, THE JAPANESE MIND 53 (1988) (“Probably 
the single most important thing to know about Japanese is that they instinctively operate 
on the principle of group consensus.”); HALL & HALL, supra note 378, at 81–82 (“Har-
mony and consensus are keystones of Japanese society.”); HAMILTON & SANDERS, supra 
note 39, at 69 (“Authorities’ decision-making is also considerably more consensual in 
Japanese firms than in their American counterparts.”); Dag Leonardsen, Crime in Japan: 
Paradise Lost?, 7 J. SCANDINAVIAN STUD. CRIMINOLOGY CRIME PREVENTION 185, 206 
(2006) (“Japan is a society based on consensus . . . .”). 
 407. See Dag Leonardsen, Crime in Japan—A Lesson for Criminological Theory? The 
Cultural Dimension in Crime—What Can the Japanese Experience Tell Us? 9 (British 
Society of Criminology Conference, Bangor, U.K., Paper, June 2003), http://www.brit 
soccrim.org/volume6/008.pdf (“The concept of kaisha means group consciousness and 
this group consciousness is all-important for Japanese citizens . . . . If one arranges the 
value foundation of Japanese society hierarchically, the value of harmony within the 
group is at the top.”). 
 408. See Case No. 39 of 2005, 60 MINSHŪ NO. 2 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 17, 2006), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2006.02.17-2005.-Kyo-.No.. 
39.html and supra notes 324–34 and accompanying text. 
 409. Id. 
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had a shared interest with their company in objecting to the disclosure of 
the report prepared by the government investigators.410 Unlike Fuji Bank, 
in this case the information in the report was not internal to the group or 
company. Rather, the information was disclosed because of a positive 
obligation to disclose information to the higher group, namely the society 
at large in the form of the government. No group privacy interest was 
implicated because disclosures were not made in a group context. Like-
wise, no personal privacy interest was implicated as there was no way to 
link the various opinions or factual statements to any specific employee. 
Hence, no group decision-making interest was implicated. However, the 
portion of the investigative report that disclosed the internal decision-
making process of the Labor Department was deemed exempt from pro-
duction.411 Indeed, Japan’s Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) spe-
cifically exempts from disclosure government documents containing “in-
ternal deliberations that would harm the free and frank exchange of opin-
ions or hinder internal decision-making.”412 
Viewed in this light, the Supreme Court of Japan may be supporting 
the communal value and group norm of Japanese society when it implies 
that a privacy interest exists when an ongoing firm (or government 
agency)413 is asked to produce decision-making documents, but does not 
                                                                                                             
 410. See Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No.. 
11.html and supra notes 276–90 and accompanying text. 
 411. Id. The Court explained:  
The part of the Document relating to Information II contains information on the 
decision-making process within the administrative authorities, and it is obvious 
in light of its contents that there is a specific likelihood that this part might pre-
vent the administrative authorities from making decisions without restrictions 
and significantly hinder the performance of public duties when it is submitted 
to the main case. 
Id. 
 412. See DAVID BANISAR, PRIVACY INT’L, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AROUND THE 
WORLD 2006 95, available at http://www.privacyinternational.org/foi/foisurvey2006.pdf. 
 413. The Japanese bureaucracy also operates on a lifetime employment system. Thus, 
there exists a government equivalent of the corporate community that is present in the 
private sector. See John O. Haley, Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis, 
Address at Cornell University School of Law: Why Study Japanese Law? (Feb. 27, 2007) 
(on file with author). Professor Haley describes this analogue:  
A newly hired twenty-two year old assistant judge, newly recruited Ministry of 
Finance official, Mitsubishi bank employee or Fuji Motors manager knew then 
that thirty-five years hence at age 57 his (women were not included) and his 
family’s welfare depended fundamentally on the political presence or prosper-
ity of the organization they had joined. Lacking the possibility of exit, individ-
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protect a privacy interest once the community has been broken by the 
dissolution (or pending dissolution) of the firm. Similarly, the communal 
value may be protected when internal communications made in the deci-
sion-making process are protected. Group values are not adversely af-
fected by the disclosure of communications containing policy determina-
tions as to how the group should deal with the public from higher rank-
ing members of the group to other group members. By leaving the pa-
rameters of the privacy interest vague, the Supreme Court allows itself 
the opportunity to better define the scope of privacy at a future date when 
a clearer consensus regarding privacy emerges in Japanese society. 
It seems that both ongoing private employers and government agencies 
may comfortably rely on the self-use exception when the decision-
making advice from its employees is the subject of a document produc-
tion motion. The Court seems clear in holding that private and public 
employers must be allowed to receive the uncensored opinions of staff 
and must be assured that employees can freely engage in the decision-
making process without the concern that those opinions or ideas will be 
used to the company’s disadvantage in litigation. 
                                                                                                             
ual Japanese had (and I believe still have) little choice but to pursue the collec-
tive interest of the public agency, the firm or family business to which they had 
tied their future. 
Id. See also John O. Haley, Whence, What and Whither Japan, 19 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 473, 479–80 (1998) (reviewing TROUBLED INDUSTRIES: CONFRONTING 
ECONOMIC CHANGE IN JAPAN (Robert M. Uriu ed., 1996) and JAPANESE LABOUR AND 
MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION: DIVERSITY, FLEXIBILITY AND PARTICIPATION (Mari Sako & 
Hiroki Sato eds., 1997)); TAKIE SUGIYAMA LEBRA, supra note 378, at 31–32.  
  To some degree, the ties within a government community may be even stronger 
than those in the purely private sector, as mandatory retirement from government may 
come at an earlier age than in the private sector, necessitating post-government employ-
ment through agency assistance. See BRIAN WOODALL, JAPAN UNDER CONSTRUCTION: 
CORRUPTION, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC WORKS 140 (1996) (“The lifetime employment and 
amakudari systems also offer fierce disincentives for would-be whistle-blowers. Since 
the post retirement prospects of government officials relate directly to the level and pres-
tige of their final posting in the bureaucracy, officials do whatever it takes to secure pro-
motion.”). Kono and Clegg describe the role of lifetime employment policies in Japan as 
follows: 
In Japan, male organization members are expected to devote themselves to the 
organization, sacrificing their leisure and home life for the obligations that the 
company assumes. . . . The obligation that respect for people must be behind 
the policies that the organization assumes supports organization members in 
their devotion to the organization. Lifetime employment is one of these poli-
cies.  
KONO & CLEGG, supra note 399, at 371. 
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The cases do not address the potential interaction between the in cam-
era and redaction rights of the Court and a plaintiff’s need for production 
of facts as distinguished from opinions or advice. In other words, would 
the free flow of in-house ideas and communications be subverted if fac-
tual material was produced, even if the opinions of staff were redacted? 
In at least one case the Court has made such a distinction—when it ex-
empted opinions and techniques of government investigators in its order 
requiring production of material obtained by the government investiga-
tors from interviews with employees of the company.414 The factual ma-
terial encompassed by the order did not meet the self-use exception be-
cause it did not constitute a government secret and was not directly con-
nected to a specific employee. Thus, no personal privacy interest was at 
stake. 
It may be that a similar rule will arise in the private company produc-
tion arena; however, the employer-employee group relationship may be 
so inviolable that even a redacted version of internal communications 
would be deemed unpalatable. While the scope of the group privacy right 
is untested, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the free flow of informa-
tion within an ongoing business entity may mean that all decision-
making documents prepared solely for use within the company are im-
mune from production, even if the material is simply factual in nature or 
merely records policies or decisions. 
Among the types of disadvantage that might be utilized to support the 
self-use exception are the common privileges, such as the trade secret or 
attorney-client privileges. Still, the cases to date suggest that more is re-
quired than simply the possessor’s statement that a privilege or secret is 
involved. The Court has required a searching inquiry into whether the 
material involved is truly secret or privileged. For example, the manufac-
turer who argued that its schematic was a secret could nonetheless be 
ordered to produce the schematic unless it could show that it would suf-
fer some disadvantage as a consequence of production, thus demonstrat-
ing it was indeed a trade secret.415 Similarly, the insurance administrator 
                                                                                                             
 414. See Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No.. 
11.html and supra notes 276–90 and accompanying text. 
 415. See Case No. 20 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 1073 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 10, 2000), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.3.10-1999.-Kyo-.No. 
20.html and supra notes 136–54 and accompanying text. Under Japanese law, a news 
reporter may refuse to identify sources under the professional secrets privilege of article 
197 of the 1996 Code. See MINSOHŌ, art. 197, para. 2. However, this privilege is not 
absolute and in determining whether the reporter may refuse to testify, the court must 
balance factors such as the significance of the news report, the manner in which the re-
porter gathered the information, and the effect that disclosure would have on future re-
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could not invoke attorney-client privilege to avoid production when the 
attorney was merely an investigation commission member, not a lawyer 
for the insurance company.416 This principle is consistent with the 
Court’s treatment of official or state secrets in documents held by the 
government. In this context, the court must make a searching examina-
tion into the validity of the government’s rationale for refusing produc-
tion. A court is unlikely to substitute its judgment for that of government, 
but it will require a reasoned explanation that is within the realm of dis-
cretion afforded the official refusing production. 
C. Cultural Values Affecting Unresolved Issues—Third Party Document 
Creators 
In article 220, the Code refers to the exclusive use of the document by 
the possessor of the document but does not specify whether the possessor 
must also be creator of the document.417 If the creator of the document is 
not also the corporation-possessor, does the self-use exception apply? In 
Fuji Bank, the Court discussed preparation only in terms of its ultimate 
use, i.e., whether the document was intended for internal use only. Fuji 
Bank did not consider the questions raised by third party document crea-
tors, as the documents in that case were internally created. The issue will 
                                                                                                             
porting activities against the nature of the suit and its value to society, the importance of 
the testimony, and whether alternative means of proving the relevant fact are available. 
See Case No. 19 of 2006, 59 MINSHŪ (Sup. Ct., Oct. 3, 2006), translation available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2006.10.03-2006.-Kyo-.No..19.html. The 
reference by the Court to the manner in which the reporter obtained the information may 
relate to an earlier decision by the Court upholding a reporter’s conviction in a case 
where a news reporter was found to have overstepped the line of what was culturally 
acceptable when he obtained material for his report through a sexual relationship with a 
source and ended the affair after obtaining the report information. See Nishiyama v. Ja-
pan, 32 KEISHU 457 (Sup. Ct., May 31, 1978), translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & 
HIRSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN, 1970 THROUGH 1990 543, 545 
(1996). Nishiyama involved a report that there had been a secret deal between the United 
States and Japan regarding the payment of certain costs relating to the reversion of Oki-
nawa to Japan. Id. The government denied that there was any such deal. In 2000 and 
2002, the United States government released files indicating that the reporter’s story may 
have been accurate. Id. Nishiyama sued, arguing that the government had illegally con-
victed him and had ruined his reputation. Id. In March 2007, the Tokyo District Court 
dismissed the action based on the twenty-year statute of limitations. See Reporter Fails to 
Clear Name over ‘72 Scoop, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 28, 2007. 
 416. See Case No. 14 of 2004, 58 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 26, 2004), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2004.11.26-2004-Kyo-No.. 
14.html and supra notes 193–203 and accompanying text. 
 417. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(d). 
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inevitably arise, and the principles reviewed thus far do, nonetheless, 
provide some guidance as to how a court would approach the issue. 
Japanese companies make extensive use of business consultants. Pro-
duction of a consultant’s reports could be at least as damaging to the free 
flow of decision-making materials as the disclosure of documents in Fuji 
Bank would have been. While outside consultants do not participate in 
the employer-employee corporate community, they do share some com-
monality with the community. At least for the duration of the project for 
which they have been engaged, the outside consultant may reasonably be 
considered as a part of the “corporate team.” In this sense, a document 
created by a third party could be viewed as user-created. Moreover, a 
strict interpretation of the self-use exception, which requires commonal-
ity between the creator and possessor, might chill the use of independent 
examination at the very time when statutory auditors (who, in Japan, au-
dit all activities of the company, not simply its accounting or financial 
functions) are being phased out in favor of independent directors.418 In 
this context, cooperation with independent investigators is not subject to 
fine or potential criminal penalty, as is the case in a government investi-
gation. Thus, independent investigators truly rely on the cooperation of 
company employees and interviewees to perform their investigative 
function. Such cooperation could well be compromised if the report were 
subject to production in litigation. 
Similarly, to require production of advice documents from independent 
consultants would force companies to perform such functions in-house. 
When those functions are better performed by outside consultants, it 
could have a detrimental effect on the entire corporate community. In 
cases where an independent investigation or consultant’s report has been 
prepared for use exclusively by the company commissioning the project, 
                                                                                                             
 418. Prior to 2006, Japanese corporations were required to appoint statutory auditors. 
See SHŌHŌ [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, arts. 273–280, translated in EHS 
LAW BULL. SER. no. 2200 (2001). In response to the economic downturn of the 1990s, the 
Commercial Code was amended to permit a more Americanized board of directors struc-
ture under which outside directors (i.e., directors who are not employees of the corpora-
tion) would serve on boards of large corporations. See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis Mil-
haupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate Governance, 53 
AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 344 (2005). The board would monitor the affairs of the company 
and the operations would be carried out by corporate executives. Id. at 353. Corporations 
utilizing the outside director system could also adopt a committee system, provided the 
committees’ composition consisted of a majority of outside directors. Id. at 352–53. 
Companies adopting the outside director system could do away with the statutory auditor 
positions. Id. 
2007] CONTEXT, CULTURE, COMMUNITY 199 
it is likely that a court would treat such a report as it would treat an inter-
nally-created document.419 
An even more likely scenario is where the party for whose exclusive 
use the document was prepared distributes the document externally to 
obtain advice from a consultant. In such a case, can the possessor suc-
cessfully invoke the self-use exception? In Fuji Bank, the Court did dis-
cuss the fact that, when the document was prepared, the possessor did not 
anticipate that it would ultimately be disclosed to outsiders.420 But the 
Court in Fuji Bank did not contemplate a scenario in which a document 
might be sent to a consultant as part of a decision-making process. In 
such a case, this out-of-house consultant should be deemed in-house for 
purposes of the self-use exception because she performs the same func-
tion as an in-house employee. 
Since Japanese companies have different stakeholders and stakeholder 
relationships than do American firms, it is possible to imagine a variety 
of scenarios not addressed by Fuji Bank.421 What if the out-of-house pos-
sessor is a related company—perhaps the lead bank for the preparer of 
the document? What if the lead bank prepared the report for the use of 
the possessor? Are members of a corporate group like members of a po-
litical faction who receive research reports prepared by the faction?422 In 
the case discussed above, the faction members that received the report 
were not the preparers, nor was the faction an incorporated group. Never-
theless, the faction members arguably represented a group that, like the 
                                                                                                             
 419. Of course, the court has the authority to order third persons, i.e. not parties to 
litigation, to produce documents. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223, paras. 1–2. 
 420. See Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 MINSHŪ 1787 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 12, 1999), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1999.11.12-1999-kyo-No.2. 
html. 
 421. Milhaupt, supra note 57, at 19–22. Milhaupt explains this difference: 
[L]arge independent shareholders and groups of interconnected institutions, not 
dispersed individuals, have characterized Japanese shareholding patterns . . . . 
[C]apital investment seldom represents the totality of the relationship between 
shareholders and the managers who concededly control the corporation even in 
Japan. . . . [S]hareholder-oriented corporate organs and mechanisms have tradi-
tionally played little role in the life of the Japanese firm. . . . As career-long 
employees themselves, Japanese managers pursue employee welfare at least as 
vigorously as shareholder interests. . . . Strong institutions characterized by 
highly relational interaction form the key constraints: main banks, keiretsu cor-
porate groups, enduring firm-specific employment patterns. 
Id. 
 422. See Case No. 2 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 9 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 10, 2005), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.11.10-2005.-Gyo-Fu-
.No..2.html. 
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corporate community, was entitled to the free-flow of information so that 
faction decisions could be made with all information available to all 
members. This principle, to the extent it applied to members of a political 
faction, should apply to consultants and other important players in the 
Japanese corporate context. 
Another possible factual scenario within this third-party issue is how a 
holding company will be treated by a court. Now that holding companies 
are once again permissible in Japan, is a court to consider all members of 
the holding company structure as a single possessor?423 Is there a differ-
ence between the parent of a wholly-owned subsidiary and a parent of a 
partially-owned subsidiary? Should the Japanese legal system adopt an 
analysis similar to that found in the American Copperweld case and its 
progeny?424 The Court is unlikely to enter this arena. Instead, the Court 
will likely adopt a general rule that treats all members of the holding 
company as one for purposes of possessor analysis. The determining fac-
tors will likely be whether the possessor for whose benefit the document 
was made will be significantly injured, and whether the entity to whom 
the document was sent and who is in possession would, as a matter of 
Japanese norm, be considered an appropriate entity to receive the docu-
ment. It is unlikely that technical questions of the juridical relationship of 
preparer and possessor will be considered. 
It seems clear that only the possessor ordered to produce or the re-
questor denied production have standing to appeal a production order.425 
Thus, if the document is in the hands of a third person who is not a party 
to the litigation, the party whose cause might be hurt by production lacks 
standing to appeal the production order. But does such party have stand-
                                                                                                             
 423. See Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kōsei Torihiki no Kakuho ni kansuru 
Hōritsu [Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act], Law. No. 54 of 1947, transla-
tion available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/amended_ama.pdf; Andrew 
H. Thorson & Frank Siegfanz, The 1997 Deregulation of Japan’s Holding Companies, 8 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 261, 263 (1999) (explaining that pure holding companies had 
been banned for fifty years). 
 424. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 742, 767 (1984), the 
Supreme Court held that there was an economic unity between a parent corporation and a 
wholly owned subsidiary because there was only one economic actor and only one eco-
nomic mind. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 742, 767–77 
(1984). Thus, the parent and subsidiary could not conspire to violate the antitrust laws. Id. 
at 777. See also Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006); Jack Russell Terrier Network 
of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d. 1027 (9th Cir. 2005) (economic unity test 
applied in a Sherman Act Section 1 case where separate entities had common objective 
and were not competitors). 
 425. See Case No. 35 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2709 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No.. 
35.html and supra notes 155–69 and accompanying text. 
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ing to object to the request for production in the first instance? Does the 
lack of standing to appeal mean that the party has no standing to raise the 
self-use exception when a motion to order production has been made? 
After all, the party is not the possessor, and if the possessor of the docu-
ment has no objection to production, why should the party have any right 
to object? The answer may lie in the nature of “voluntary” production by 
a third person. 
If a third person possesses a document, he may volunteer that docu-
ment to a party to use in litigation, assuming no other legal bar exists, 
such as a confidentiality agreement. On the other hand, a third person in 
possession of a document may be unwilling to produce without a court 
order, even when they have no objection to production. The order, issued 
by government authority, may provide the needed societal lubricant for 
the possessor, who would otherwise be seen as volunteering to produce. 
Since Japanese courts lack general injunctive powers, a determination by 
the court not to enter an order requiring production does not obligate the 
third person possessor to refuse to voluntarily produce. Nonetheless, if 
the requestor resorted to the court, it is likely that a court’s refusal to en-
ter such an order (or to suggest that production be made) would have a 
chilling effect on attempts by the requestor to obtain voluntary produc-
tion. In such a situation, it makes sense for the objecting party to present 
its objections to the court. Limiting the right to make such arguments to 
the first-level trial court is consistent with the Supreme Court’s determi-
nation that only the possessor ordered to produce or the requestor denied 
production may appeal to the High Court.426 
D. Reconciling the Freedom of Information Act and the 1996 Code 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the 1996 Code to be less lenient on 
the government and has required production even when state secrets are 
involved. These cases may be instructive when the Japanese Freedom of 
Information Act is tested in the Supreme Court.427 Under the FOIA: 
                                                                                                             
 426. See Case No. 35 of 1999, 54 MINSHŪ 2709 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 2000), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2000.12.14-1999.-Kyo-.No.. 
35.html. Allowing the party adversely affected to present its position to the District Court 
is also consistent with article 223 of the 1996 Code, which allows an entity whose private 
secret is in government possession an opportunity to object when the secret would be 
revealed if the document request were granted. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223. 
 427. See Gyōsei kikan no hōyūsuru jōhō no kōkai ni kansuru hōritsu [Law Concerning 
Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs], Law No. 42 of 1999, art. 5, 
translation available at http://www.soumu.go.jp/gyoukan/kanri/translation4.htm. Article 
6 contains provisions under which certain information may be partially disclosed and 
partially withheld. Id. art. 6. 
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There are six broad categories of exemptions. Documents can be with-
held if they contain information about a specific individual unless the 
information is made public by law or custom, is necessary to protect a 
life, or relates to a public official in his public duties; corporate infor-
mation that risks harming its interests and was given voluntarily in con-
fidence; information that puts national security or international rela-
tions or negotiations at risk; information that would hinder law en-
forcement; internal deliberations that would harm the free and frank 
exchange of opinions or hinder internal decision-making; business of a 
public organ relating to inspection and supervision, contracts, research, 
personnel management, or business enterprise. Exempted information 
can be disclosed by the head of the agency “when it is deemed that 
there is a particular public-interest need.” The head of the agency can 
also refuse to admit the existence of the information if answering the 
request will reveal the information.428 
Article 220 of the Code also specifically exempts government docu-
ments from production, providing that it is: “a document containing offi-
cial secrets held by public officials, which is likely to harm the public 
interest or significantly hinder the performance of public duties when it 
is produced.”429 Yet to be worked out by the Supreme Court is the rela-
tionship between the FOIA and the requirements for production of gov-
ernment-held documents.430 
The Supreme Court has held that company secrets disclosed to the la-
bor investigators in the course of an investigation became government 
secrets once integrated into the investigator’s report.431 The secrets in-
                                                                                                             
 428. See BANISAR, supra note 412. Of particular relevance here is article 5(5), which 
exempts from disclosure “information concerning deliberations, examinations, or consul-
tations internal to or between either organs of the State . . . [or] local public entities . . . 
that, if made public, would risk unjustly harming the frank exchange of opinions or the 
neutrality of decision making . . . .” MINSOHŌ, art. 5, para. 5. 
 429. See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(b). This code language is quoted by two Supreme 
Court cases. See Case No. 4 (Gyo-Fu) of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 6 (Sup. Ct., July 22, 
2005), translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.07. 
22-2005.-Gyo-Fu-.No..4.html; Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 
2005), translation available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10. 
14-2005.-Kyo-.No..11.html. 
 430. For a discussion of the needs for greater disclosure in Japan, see C. Raj Kumar, 
Corruption in Japan—Institutionalizing the Right to Information, Transparency and the 
Right to Corruption-Free Governance, 10 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2004). 
 431. Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No.. 
11.html. The Court held:  
“Official secrets held by public officials” thus construed should be deemed to 
include not only secrets relating to affairs under the control of public officials 
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volved in that case did not implicate the FOIA because they were not 
given to the investigators voluntarily (the Labor Law compelled disclo-
sure), nor were they given in confidence.432 But it is easy to contemplate 
a situation where private information is given voluntarily yet is also con-
fidential. While exempt from general public disclosure under the FOIA, 
would this kind of private secret be converted into a public secret exempt 
from production? It is likely that a court’s analysis would turn on 
whether disclosure by the government would adversely affect the gov-
ernment’s ability to carry out its public interest functions. 
While the Court has concluded that an employer could not refuse to 
cooperate with the government when the law requires disclosure,433 the 
analysis could change where the information is given voluntarily. The 
principle expounded by the High Court—namely that disclosure would 
restrict the government’s access to information, injuring its ability to per-
form its functions—would apply, rendering disclosure in this context 
inappropriate.434 
                                                                                                             
but also secrets of private persons that public officials came to know in the per-
formance of their duties, which are likely to damage the relationships between 
the public officials and the private persons and hinder fair and smooth opera-
tion of public duties when they are disclosed. 
Article 223 of the 1996 Code recognizes a right for the government to refuse to 
produce private secrets contained in government documents and also gives the 
private party whose technical or business secrets might be disclosed an oppor-
tunity to present its reasons for non-disclosure.  
Id. (citing MINSOHŌ, art. 223). 
 432. See Gyōsei kikan no hōyūsuru jōhō no kōkai ni kansuru hōritsu [Law Concerning 
Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs], Law No. 42 of 1999, art. 5, para. 
2(b), translation available at http://www.soumu.go.jp/gyoukan/kanri/translation4.htm. 
 433. See Case No. 11 of 2005, 59 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 14, 2005), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.10.14-2005.-Kyo-.No.. 
11.html. 
 434. Id. The Court reasoned:  
[I]t cannot be denied that if, when workers and subcontractors have provided 
information on industrial accidents, the fact that they provide information or the 
contents of the information were easily made public, some of such persons 
concerned would provide the investigators in charge with only insufficient in-
formation, for fear of reprisals of the employer disadvantaged by the provision 
of information. . . . Therefore, the disclosure of the Document would damage 
the relationships of trust between the workers and the Investigators in Charge, 
which seems likely to hinder the investigators from hearing statements of the 
persons concerned, an extremely important duty for identifying the safety con-
trol system at workplaces and the cause of accident in similar types of accident 
investigation.  
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Article 220 of the 1996 Code defines the categories of documents that 
are subject to court-ordered production, illustrating that document pro-
duction is neither automatic nor, like the United States system, under the 
parties’ control. In Japan, production is a matter of court order.435 Article 
223 of the 1996 Code, which deals with court orders, specifically re-
quires that the government be given notice and the opportunity to object 
when a party seeks production of government documents.436 The gov-
ernment is then given an opportunity to object to the production. Article 
223 also contains special exemption provisions for government docu-
ments, one of which tracks one of the six FOIA exemptions: “[t]he 
document is likely to impair national security, harm the relationships of 
trust with foreign countries or international organizations, or put Japan at 
a disadvantage in negotiation with foreign countries or international or-
ganizations.”437 
While the FOIA does not contain a provision allowing a court on an 
appeal of an FOIA determination to conduct an in camera review of the 
materials requested, the 1996 Code does. Under article 223, the court has 
authority to examine reasons given by the government supporting its ob-
jection to production and should deny production if there is good reason 
for the official’s position. In making this determination, the 1996 Code 
directs the court to conduct an in camera examination of the document at 
issue so that it can evaluate the reason given against the information con-
tained in the document.438 Although the Supreme Court has yet to apply 
article 223 to order production, it has indicated that the government must 
have sufficient and good reasons to refuse document production. It ap-
pears that while production of government documents is not to be re-
jected lightly, good reasons must be submitted to the court to sustain 
such a finding. It is likely that the government has received this message 
and it will be easier for future litigants to obtain government documents 
when there is no state secret involved.439 Or, at least it will be more diffi-
                                                                                                             
Id. The High Court noted that the employee’s concern was not with personal privacy, but 
with reprisal against their employer. Id. This reflects the need to protect the corporate 
community.  
 435. Although the Code calls for court orders to produce documents, it is more likely 
that the court will request that the documents be produced, using its authority to compel 
only if necessary. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223. 
 436. See id. art. 223. 
 437. Id. 
 438. See MINSOHŌ, art. 223, paras. 3–5. 
 439. This being said, it does not mean that the government will not try to devise new 
means for avoiding production of documents it wishes to keep confidential. With the 
passage of a privacy law designed to protect certain personal privacy interests of indi-
viduals from disclosure by private corporations, it is likely that the government will make 
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cult for the government to withhold documents on the basis of govern-
ment secrets than has been the case in the past. 
CONCLUSION 
Fuji Bank appeared to be a major setback to those who sought a more 
relaxed standard for production, but the decision aligns with Japanese 
norms of community and harmonious decision making. Fuji Bank 
changed the pre-1996 Code judicial interpretation of what constituted a 
self-use document and implicitly rejected the views of Professors Tani-
guchi and Mochizuki that the 1996 Code changed the presumption that a 
document should be produced. Since Fuji Bank, the Court’s decisions 
appear to both protect the decision-making functions of the corporate 
community while also furthering and strengthening the norms of har-
mony and community within the corporation. The Supreme Court’s focus 
on and protection of the sanctity of decision-making documents is con-
sistent with the historic and cultural values of the Tokugawa village and 
feudal family structure and reinforces their analogies in their modern 
surrogate, the corporate employer in a lifetime employment system. 
Clearly, distribution of internal memos is an important part of the free 
flow of information within an organization that is important to the proper 
functioning of the entity. The free flow of information can positively af-
fect morale, sales, manufacturing, and much more. All of these positive 
effects may flow even when the information sent does not implicate pri-
vacy concerns or disclose trade secrets. Yet, the Court, in its decision 
allowing production of a bank’s internal correspondence setting out bank 
policy, does not explore whether the production of the documents might 
adversely effect the free flow of information from management to em-
ployees or from the home office to branches.440 If production adversely 
affects the free flow of information within the organization, it might very 
well cause the company to restrict the type and volume of information 
the company shared between head offices, branches, management, and 
employees. The Court seems focused solely on the free flow of informa-
tion for decision-making purposes, the fact pattern found in Fuji Bank. 
                                                                                                             
greater use of the exemption from the FOIA where information about a specific individ-
ual (e.g., a government official or employee) is involved. See Kojin jōhō no hogo ni kan-
suru hōritsu [Act on the Protection of Personal Privacy], Law No. 57 of 2003, translation 
available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/APPI.pdf. See also FRESHFIELDS 
BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION LAW (Sept. 2007), avail-
able at http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2007/sept12/19861.pdf. 
 440. Case No. 39 of 2005, 60 MINSHŪ NO. 2 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 17, 2006), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2006.02.17-2005.-Kyo-.No.. 
39.html. 
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This focus exposes some internal administrative documents to production 
orders—but it also protects the Japanese norms of community and har-
mony in decision-making. 
Similarly, the Court allowed production of factual information in in-
vestigative reports that have the public interest as their ultimate goal—in 
a decision about a government labor investigation, and in another deci-
sion dealing with an investigative report prepared for the administrator of 
a failed insurance company.441 In both cases, although the subject of the 
investigation did not instigate the investigation, the public interest served 
by the investigation was a major factor in the Court’s decisions. Where a 
company commissions an external independent investigation to serve 
both a company goal (e.g., restoring public confidence in the company) 
and a public goal (e.g., protecting the public from a potentially unsafe 
product), the preparer and possessor will be different juridical entities. 
Recognizing the legal difference between the preparer and possessor of 
the document, as well as the public interest in the investigation report, 
would allow courts to order production of at least some information in 
independent investigative reports. 
On the other hand, ordering production of investigative reports, as a 
general matter, could spell the end of outside independent investigations 
and could inhibit the free flow of material that company executives need 
to make decisions. How the Court will expand or restrict these outside 
investigative reports in the private sector remains to be seen. Perhaps the 
Court will develop an ad hoc rule based on the undefined special circum-
stances exception in Fuji Bank, enabling it to protect the free flow of de-
cision-making information to management while recognizing the pub-
lic’s need for factual information in some circumstances. 
Additionally, the Court appears to have relaxed the definition of a rela-
tionship document to include documents that are not mutually executed 
by the parties and to include some of the documents underlying the crea-
tion of the relationship. The provision of article 220 of the 1996 Code 
that allows a party access to documents where that right is secured in 
substantive law, has also been relaxed. Thus, although there may not be a 
specific statutory provision that grants a party a right to have a document 
produced, it may be sufficient that one party has a legal duty to keep re-
cords, and refusing access to those records would be a breach of good 
faith or an abuse of rights—especially if there is administrative guidance 
to permit access. 
                                                                                                             
 441. See Case No. 14 of 2004, 58 MINSHŪ NO. 8 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 26, 2004), translation 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2004.11.26-2004-Kyo-No.. 
14.html and supra notes 193–203 and accompanying text. 
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It must be remembered that what is at stake in these cases is not dis-
covery in the American legal sense, but production of documents. A 
party seeking production still has a high hurdle when making a case for 
production of documents. Most smoking gun documents are likely to be 
related to decision making, and thus fall within the self-use exception. 
Still, the recent cases are a departure from the more restricted rule of Fuji 
Bank, a literal reading of the 1996 Code, and diverge from the Old 
Code’s judicial doctrine of self-use. The Supreme Court’s emerging doc-
trine, while somewhat opening production to administrative corporate 
documents, keeps the door closed to the production of decision-making 
documents, both of which further the cultural value of community in the 
corporate setting. 
It remains to be seen how far the Supreme Court will go in liberalizing 
the document production rules. It is likely that additional cases dealing 
with the interpretation of the 1996 Code will be forthcoming. Mean-
while, lower courts, especially those that have previously shown them-
selves to be more accommodating to document production than the Su-
preme Court, may well read these recent cases as allowing them greater 
discretion in ordering parties to produce documents. As the Japanese 
courts cautiously proceed to define the boundaries of document produc-
tion under the 1996 Code, it is likely that the notions of context, custom, 
and community will continue to guide the doctrine. 
